The Singular Power of U.S. Section 301
On Tuesday, May 26, the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States (AFPC-USA) hosted an educational program, in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation, to help foreign correspondents better understand why Section 301 is currently at the center of US trade policy discussions. The discussion featured Dr. Deborah Kay Elms, Head of Trade Policy at the Hinrich Foundation, and was based on her recent white paper, “Super and Special: The singular power of US Section 301.” She delved into why Section 301 has become such an important and consequential policy instrument, how it can be used by the executive branch, and what its broader implications may be for global trade relations, supply chains, and international economic diplomacy.
Foreign correspondents learned what Section 301 is, why it remains one of the most powerful tools in US trade policy, how it differs from other trade instruments, why it provides greater legal certainty and flexibility for executive action, how the United States can use Section 301 to impose duties, restrictions, or other retaliatory measures against trade partners, why recent Section 301 actions matter for countries, companies, exporters, and global supply chains, and what international journalists should watch for when covering future Section 301 investigations, hearings, and policy developments.
The discussion was moderated by Mara Lee, a reporter for International Trade Today and its sister publications Export Compliance Daily and Trade Law Daily.
AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this educational program. Below, foreign journalists can read the takeaways from the discussion.
Dr. Elms said she wrote the paper because Section 301 is being positioned as the likely successor to current US tariff policy after the collapse of the Trump administration’s reliance on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). She explained that when President Donald Trump returned to office, the administration used IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs globally, most memorably during the April 2 Rose Garden announcement, where Trump “held up those big poster boards and sort of tariffed everybody on the planet.” After the Supreme Court struck down that authority in February 2026, the US shifted to a temporary framework imposing 10% tariffs through July. According to Dr. Elms, Washington is now expected to move toward “more durable tariff authorities” found in Section 301 before the temporary measures expire.
Dr. Elms said she became concerned after repeatedly hearing analysts argue that Trump’s tariff powers had effectively disappeared with the fall of IEEPA and that future trade policy would involve “less tariffs and more common sense.” Because part of her PhD dissertation focused on Section 301, she believed “this is very dangerous” thinking and wanted to explain how powerful the statute actually is. Providing historical context, Dr. Elms explained that Section 301 emerged in the 1970s and 1980s before the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the time, the US believed the global trade system lacked meaningful enforcement tools. Congress therefore created Section 301, allowing the United States to act as “judge, jury, and executioner” in trade disputes and punish countries for practices Washington deemed unfair. She noted that the law was used heavily during the 1980s, particularly against Japan, which the US accused of unfair trade behavior. Under the original framework, the US would identify a trade problem, negotiate with the targeted country, and only impose sanctions if negotiations failed. In practice, however, sanctions were rarely implemented because disputes were usually resolved “at 11:59 PM” before penalties formally took effect.
Dr. Elms said the creation of the WTO in 1995 changed the equation. With a formal dispute settlement mechanism now in place, the United States largely abandoned Section 301. That changed during the first Trump administration, when then-US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer revived the tool, particularly against China, arguing there was “no other way” to address unfair trade practices. Dr. Elms noted that the Biden administration continued those policies and that the current Trump administration has now expanded them further. She explained that there are currently two active Section 301 investigations involving as many as 60 US trading partners. One concerns forced labor, accusing countries either of engaging in forced labor practices or failing to adequately police supply chains. The second targets what the administration calls “structural excess capacity,” meaning countries are allegedly producing too much of certain goods and “dumping” them into global markets to the detriment of the United States. Dr. Elms said announcements on those cases could come “at any time.”
Dr. Deborah Kay Elms
A major concern, she said, is that the Trump administration fundamentally altered how Section 301 is applied. Historically, investigations came first, and sanctions followed only later if negotiations failed. Under Trump, however, the administration effectively reversed the process: “You are guilty after the investigation, guilty. We impose sanctions and then potentially we can negotiate our way out of that.” She expects the administration to continue operating that way, likely using tariffs as punishment, though she stressed that Section 301 allows for a far broader range of retaliatory measures. Because the US acts unilaterally under the statute, “the sky is the limit” regarding the kinds of actions Washington could impose. She warned that businesses and governments are underestimating the breadth and flexibility of Section 301 authority. She argued that companies and policymakers need to prepare now because the current “Section 301 frenzy” is “just getting started.”
Lee agreed with Dr. Elms’s argument that the Trump administration appeared “unchastened by the loss of the Supreme Court” when it comes to tariff authority. However, Lee added nuance by pointing to the Nicaragua Section 301 case, which began under the Biden administration but had its punishment phase handled during the Trump administration. Lee noted that stakeholder feedback moderated the final outcome because the administration ultimately chose not to impose tariffs on Nicaraguan goods despite findings of human rights violations. According to Lee, domestic commercial interests (particularly the integrated supply chain linking Central American garment production with US yarn producers and cotton growers) played a significant role in softening the response. Lee also referenced comments from US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who said the administration would open another round of stakeholder input before deciding on any new tariffs. Still, Lee cautioned that such moderation would only go so far because Donald Trump remains “very suspicious of corporations,” viewing them as actors trying “to outsource and save money and screw over the American workers.” Lee then shifted the discussion to the original purpose of Section 301, asking whether Congress had been wrong in the 1970s and 1980s to focus so heavily on non-tariff barriers and exports as drivers of US prosperity. Lee observed that exports fluctuated significantly during that era, rising and falling as a percentage of gross domestic product, before asking if policymakers had overestimated their importance.
Dr. Elms responded by explaining the economic anxieties of the 1970s and 1980s, when many Americans feared that foreign competition was eroding US industrial strength. She said there was “a real concern about the competitiveness of many markets” and growing alarm that foreign producers were “flooding the United States with excess capacity,” weakening domestic manufacturing, and slowing economic growth. At the time, expanding exports was seen as a bipartisan solution because policymakers believed access to overseas markets would “keep the machinery running domestically in the US.” She argued that exports were viewed very differently then than they are today. While both parties once saw exports as “a good thing to have,” she said that enthusiasm has since faded, especially under Trump. Although Trump occasionally praises exports, Dr. Elms said he is “predominantly interested in imports rather than exports,” reflecting the administration’s focus on restricting foreign goods entering the United States instead of expanding US access abroad.
She explained that lawmakers in that era believed US export struggles stemmed less from domestic weakness than from unfair practices overseas. These obstacles were often “non-tariff barriers,” meaning restrictions that did not take the form of direct tariffs but still disadvantaged American companies. Dr. Elms gave the example of discriminatory shipping and unloading rules that could slow the entry of US goods into foreign markets. A country might technically allow imports, she said, while still creating rules that limited unloading to certain workers or certain hours, effectively restricting US exports in practice. Such barriers were viewed in Washington as “totally unfair and discriminatory.” Because the global trade system at the time (governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT) lacked effective enforcement tools, Dr. Elms said the United States concluded it “had to do this on our own.” Section 301 therefore became a mechanism for the US to “pry these markets open” by identifying unfair practices, pressuring governments, and negotiating changes.
Dr. Elms contrasted those earlier disputes with today’s much broader and less clearly defined Section 301 investigations. Historically, she said, cases tended to focus on highly specific grievances, such as shipping rules or customs procedures. Modern cases, by contrast, are “much more amorphous.” She pointed in particular to the Trump administration’s “structural excess capacity” investigation, which she said contains contradictory claims that some countries export too much while others export too little — “the polar opposite of one another.” That contradiction, she argued, demonstrates how flexible and expansive Section 301 cases have become under the current administration. She pointed out that while non-tariff barriers remain a legitimate concern for businesses around the world, the focus of the Trump administration has fundamentally shifted. Instead of prioritizing export access, the administration is now primarily worried about imports and what it sees as unfair foreign competitiveness harming the US economy.
Lee asked how much “domestic investment and voluntary export restraints” could factor into current trade negotiations, noting that similar anxieties over manufacturing competitiveness shaped US trade policy in the 1980s. She pointed out that Robert Lighthizer, now influential again in Trump-era trade thinking, had worked on Japanese auto export restraints and efforts to encourage automakers to build plants in the United States. She also noted that Trump has emphasized investment commitments as part of modern trade deals. Dr. Elms responded that Trump’s views on trade date back to the same 1980s period, recalling that he “took out his first full-page ad complaining about Japan” and became “very obsessed with trade.” She said Trump fundamentally sees tariffs as the solution to nearly every economic problem, explaining that “in Trump’s mind, the primary tool for whatever ails you is a tariff.” While Trump might prefer tariffs alone, Dr. Elms said advisers around him recognize there are limits to relying exclusively on them and may support “more selective use of different kinds of implements or instruments.”
Dr. Elms explained that some officials could favor alternatives such as “restrain[ing] exports from the foreign partner into the United States” rather than simply “put[ting] up a wall to stop them.” However, Dr. Elms doubted today’s trading partners would embrace voluntary export restraints as readily as Japan did in the 1980s. “I am not convinced that the trade partners of the United States today would be as enthusiastic about restraining their own exports,” she said. Instead, she observed that foreign governments and companies appear far more willing to pursue “more inbound investment” or commit to “buying more US stuff” to ease tensions with Washington. Dr. Elms argued that voluntary export restraints were historically ineffective, citing research showing Japanese automakers responded by shipping fewer but far more expensive vehicles, ultimately “decimat[ing] the top end of the US market.”
Dr. Elms suggested investment pledges are far more likely to remain part of Trump-era negotiations, noting the administration is generally enthusiastic about foreign investment from allies “whether that’s Japanese or Australian or whoever else.” She also highlighted purchase agreements as another favored tool, citing Cambodia’s decision to buy “10 Boeing aircraft” as part of efforts to reduce “reciprocal tariff” pressure. Overall, Dr. Elms said some policymakers are seeking “more creative use of tools and levers” to protect US growth while limiting what the administration views as harmful import competition.
Lee then asked whether the growing number of Section 301 investigations actually matters if the Trump administration ultimately intends to impose tariffs that resemble the earlier “reciprocal tariffs” anyway. Lee referenced two already launched investigations (including one involving Brazil) as well as six additional possible probes that US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer had discussed involving sectors such as seafood and rice. Lee questioned whether the proliferation of separate Section 301 cases was meaningful if the resulting tariff structure would largely end up in the same place. Dr. Elms replied that, in practical terms, “the answer is no” for two main reasons. First, she reiterated that Section 301 is “a very powerful tool” because once the United States determines that a country is guilty of unfair trade practices, Washington can continually expand or reinterpret those findings. As she put it, “Once I found you guilty, you’re guilty of whatever it is that I decide to find you guilty of.” A country initially targeted over forced labor, she explained, could later also be accused over fisheries, rice, digital trade, or virtually any other issue.
Dr. Elms suggested that additional Section 301 investigations could nevertheless serve strategic purposes. Different cases might target different countries or sectors, and the administration could “add up the consequences” by stacking tariff penalties together. She gave a hypothetical example in which one investigation imposes a 6% tariff for forced labor, and another adds 9% for excess capacity, with additional tariffs layered on top for industries like rice. In that scenario, countries would ultimately find themselves “right back where you started on reciprocal tariff Liberation Day,” referring to the sweeping tariff announcements Trump unveiled in April. Still, Dr. Elms questioned how useful it would be to continually expand the list of targets once the administration already has roughly “60 of your largest trading partners” under investigation. She joked that it may not matter much whether “Vanuatu is now guilty of something” if the US has little trade with that country. Instead, she suggested some of these investigations may function more as future negotiating leverage than as economically significant actions in themselves.
Dr. Elms said she was “less fussed” about some of the individual sectors Greer had raised, but she singled out digital trade as especially significant. Unlike traditional trade disputes that primarily end with tariffs, she argued digital trade cases could open the door to a much broader set of retaliatory tools. In addition to tariffs, the US could impose restrictions involving “licensing or tax policy or lots of other things.” That possibility, she suggested, demonstrates how Section 301 could increasingly evolve beyond tariffs into a much wider framework for economic pressure and regulation.
Lee then raised questions about how the Trump administration’s evolving tariff structure could affect Asian economies that had previously accepted relatively high “reciprocal tariff” rates in exchange for maintaining an advantage over China. Lee noted that countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India appeared willing to tolerate tariffs in the “high teens” because they expected Chinese goods to face significantly higher rates. However, Lee pointed out that China had recently said it would only accept tariffs of “20% or less” after the Section 301 process concludes. Since many Chinese products already face older Section 301 tariffs of 25% or 7.5%, Lee questioned whether countries like Malaysia would still accept tariffs near 19% if China ultimately faced only a slightly higher 20% rate. She also asked whether those countries had any leverage to force Washington to lower their rates if they objected.
Dr. Elms responded that the situation remains fluid because, while China has publicly announced a “20% ceiling,” the United States has not committed to that figure. She suggested Washington could instead decide to keep Chinese tariff levels much higher — potentially at “34,” which she described as the level being discussed during US-China negotiations at the time. In her view, the US would likely prefer to “push the Chinese number up rather than push everyone else down” in order to preserve tariff differentials that favor other Asian exporters. She argued the administration faces a fundamental contradiction. On one hand, it wants to confront what it sees as the “Chinese perceived threat” to the US economy. On the other, it wants to maintain workable economic relationships with other trading partners across Asia. Trying to satisfy both goals simultaneously, she said, creates “real challenges” because “no matter how you slice this,” some countries are going to feel disadvantaged and angry.
Dr. Elms also warned that Washington risks upsetting both China and America’s broader network of trading partners. If Chinese tariffs fall too low relative to other countries, governments that previously accepted higher rates could conclude that the system is “really unfair.” At the same time, maintaining much higher Chinese tariffs could further inflame tensions with Beijing. “The US is in a bit of a bind,” Dr. Elms said, because it is attempting “to do things that are incompatible.” Beyond the tariffs themselves, Dr. Elms noted that many countries also resent the rationale underpinning the Section 301 investigations. Governments are not only facing economic penalties but are also being publicly accused of “forced labor,” “excess capacity,” “undercapacity,” or simply being “unfair.” For many US trading partners, she suggested, the reputational and political implications of those accusations may be just as damaging as the tariffs themselves, especially when combined with the broader economic impact of higher costs on exports to the United States.
Lee noted that Democrats have criticized Trump’s tariffs as “inflationary” and questioned whether a future Democratic administration and anti-tariff Republicans might “work together to reform 301” and limit unilateral executive power. Dr. Elms said she would “like to think so,” but argued that US legislative history suggests otherwise. She pointed to the continued existence of outdated trade authorities, including the law behind the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act tariffs, noting that despite the “Great Depression and all the sort of disaster that came after that,” Congress never removed the statute from the books. She said the same pattern applies to other trade authorities, including the emergency powers framework and Section 122 balance-of-payments provisions, which she argued no longer fit current economic realities. Dr. Elms contended that Congress historically has shown little appetite for “clean[ing] out the toolbox” or revising obsolete authorities, even when those powers are widely viewed as problematic. She argued that lawmakers tend to operate through “inertia,” avoiding the difficult work of revisiting old statutes and deciding whether they remain “fit for purpose anymore.”
Dr. Elms also questioned whether a future Congress would demonstrate “any more spine than the current Congress,” broadening her argument beyond trade policy. As an example, she cited the War Powers Resolution, saying Congress explicitly attempted to limit presidential war-making authority but has repeatedly allowed presidents to circumvent or stretch those limits without meaningful intervention. Even in matters of war, she argued, Congress has been reluctant to reclaim authority once delegated to the executive branch. She observed that while policymakers “probably should revise many of these trade tools,” she remained pessimistic that they actually would. In her view, the Section 301 debate demonstrates that the broader US trade “toolbox needs to be reviewed,” with some authorities either modernized or discarded entirely — but historical precedent suggests Congress is unlikely to take that step.
Lee then noted that Congress revised the Trading with the Enemy Act to create IEEPA, partly to limit presidential authority, and argued that Supreme Court rulings against the legislative veto have made it harder for Congress to rein in executive actions under laws like the War Powers Act. Lee pointed out that while simple majorities in Congress have recently opposed military actions, lawmakers now need veto-proof majorities to effectively stop presidents. She then asked whether a future Democratic president could independently roll back Section 301 tariffs on allies and free trade partners such as South Korea, Europe, and Japan.
Dr. Elms said that a future president “of either party” could eventually adjust or remove tariffs because they are creating “real challenges” for US companies, consumers, and investment. However, she stressed that tariffs generate substantial revenue for the federal government, making them politically difficult to eliminate once in place. She cited the Supreme Court’s overturning of IEEPA tariffs, which she said could require roughly “$166 billion” in tariffs to be repaid “with interest,” creating fiscal and political complications. Even though tariffs amount to “a disguised tax on US companies and US consumers,” she argued administrations are often reluctant to give up such revenue streams. On inflation, Dr. Elms acknowledged that tariffs are “inflationary” because prices rise to absorb the added costs, especially when tariffs are high. But she emphasized that the effect is generally temporary rather than permanently inflationary. A “20% tariff,” she explained, creates “a one-shot inflationary adjustment of prices,” not repeated annual price hikes. She added that the bigger economic problem stems from the uncertainty surrounding constantly shifting US trade policy, which is creating “real challenges” for business planning, investment, and supply chains.
Lee argued that, politically, many voters still judge inflation by whether prices return to what they “remember the right price being,” noting that even though economists understand disinflation can hurt an economy, consumers remain frustrated when grocery prices stay elevated after sharp increases during the Biden administration. Lee then turned to an audience question asking whether widespread use of unilateral trade tools like Section 301 could push the global economy away from rules-based trade and toward “power politics.” Dr. Elms said she believes the world is already moving in that direction, though she noted that “the contagion has been contained” so far. Despite fears after Trump’s “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs, most countries have not responded with sweeping retaliatory tariffs of their own. Instead, she said, “it has been the United States changing its tariffs,” while most other governments have largely maintained existing trade policies and avoided broader escalation.
Still, Dr. Elms warned that restraints on unilateral action are beginning to “break down.” Governments facing economic pressure are increasingly experimenting with protectionist measures, subsidies, and domestic-market preferences. She argued that while countries have mostly remained committed to global and regional trade rules over the past year, patience may erode if governments conclude that others (particularly the United States) are no longer following the agreed-upon system. “If you’re not going to agree to follow the rules,” she said, countries may ask, “why should I keep following the rules?” She stressed that not every country has equal leverage, meaning smaller economies may be less willing to impose harsh import restrictions that could damage their own consumers. But she cautioned that the longer unilateral trade measures persist, the more likely governments are to abandon old norms and pursue their own interests more aggressively. That erosion of the rules-based system, she argued, would be “deeply problematic” for trade-dependent economies because it would make growth, job creation, and economic stability harder to sustain. The global trading system has suffered “a sort of rupture,” leaving governments to determine how much future trade relations will still be governed by laws and norms versus raw geopolitical and economic power.
Lee then relayed a question from another reporter asking whether the expanded use of Section 301 could encourage major economies such as China, the European Union (EU), and India to create their own unilateral trade enforcement mechanisms. Lee connected the question to current trade tensions, noting that the European Union has increasingly discussed barriers against Chinese imports and that US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has openly encouraged allied economies to erect their own “walls” against what Washington sees as Chinese overcapacity. Lee explained that Greer’s strategy appears to be creating coordinated pressure on China by redirecting exports away from the US and forcing other developed economies to confront similar market distortions. She also pointed to China’s use of critical minerals export controls as an example of unilateral economic leverage, arguing that Beijing “found the lever” that ultimately pressured Washington to step back from peak tariff escalation.
In response, Dr. Elms brought up more historical context. In the 1970s and 1980s, she said, there was significant debate over whether other countries should copy the United States and adopt their own versions of Section 301. But rather than embracing unilateralism, most governments instead concluded that “allowing the United States to act unilaterally is bad” and sought to restrain all countries — including the US — through stronger international rules. That effort eventually contributed to the creation of the WTO in the 1990s. She argued that something similar could happen again. Rather than fragmenting entirely, countries outside the United States may respond by deepening cooperation and trade integration with one another. Dr. Elms pointed to the surge in new trade initiatives and negotiations since Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, saying governments are increasingly trying to “collaborate, to cooperate, to sign agreements.” Even India, historically reluctant to pursue major trade deals, is now “on a stampede” to sign agreements.
Dr. Elms cited growing interest in expanding regional trade blocs such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, along with discussions involving the European Union and smaller trade-dependent economies seeking ways to preserve open markets. According to Dr. Elms, the irony is that the US push toward unilateralism could ultimately drive “everybody else to cooperate and leave the United States behind fortress US.” At the same time, she acknowledged that some countries may search for their own forms of economic leverage or “chokeholds,” though many lack the market power of the United States, China, or the EU. She noted that even smaller actors have shown they can exert pressure under the right conditions. She predicted the current trajectory of fragmentation and protectionism would eventually become unsustainable. Rising prices, growing compliance burdens, and mounting complexity, she argued, will ultimately push governments back toward collective rulemaking and harmonized trade systems. “Eventually,” she said, countries will conclude that “this is stupid,” and seek once again to simplify trade rules and rebuild cooperation, though she cautioned that “it’s going to be a while between here and there.”
Lee introduced a question from another reporter who observed that the aggressive use of Section 301 in the 1980s and 1990s helped drive reform of the global trading system and ultimately contributed to the creation of the WTO. Lee asked whether the current wave of US trade unilateralism could similarly force a new round of WTO reform. Dr. Elms said she believes reform is possible, though extremely difficult under the WTO’s current structure. She identified the organization’s consensus system as one of its biggest obstacles, explaining that nothing can move forward unless all members agree not to block it. Using a vivid analogy, she said that if “166 members” all have to agree “on the same menu” and “the same restaurant” before ordering lunch, “I don’t think we’re eating. I think we’re starving before we actually manage to get 166 countries to agree.”
Dr. Elms argued that growing US unilateralism could indeed create pressure for WTO reform, but meaningful changes would still require Washington to stop blocking consensus. At the moment, she said, she does not see that happening under the current political climate. Still, Dr. Elms suggested that a future US administration could adopt a more cooperative approach and conclude that “we are all better off if we cooperate,” potentially allowing long-stalled reforms to move forward. She also noted that the United States is not the only country that has used WTO rules strategically. Other governments, she said, have repeatedly “taken hostages” within the institution by blocking consensus for leverage. A successful reform effort would therefore require multiple countries to decide that obstructionism “is actually not working for us either.” Despite the institutional paralysis, Dr. Elms stressed that recent events have shown how quickly supposedly impossible developments can occur. “Lots of things that you would’ve said never in a million years would take place actually are taking place,” she said. Because of that, she believes it is conceivable that the current period of trade conflict and fragmentation could eventually produce “a reformed world system” that is “more fit for purpose” for the years ahead.
In response to a question about how journalists can “distinguish between legitimate trade enforcement and protectionism when they're writing about Section 301 cases,” Dr. Elms acknowledged that the issue is inherently difficult because many disputes are “in the eye of the beholder.” She said journalists first need to ask whose perspective defines the action as legitimate or illegitimate, since governments involved in trade disputes often interpret the same policy very differently. She advised reporters to examine whether a specific rule or law is actually being violated and whether the policy in question is discriminatory. For example, she said, if a country permits all trading partners to do something except one targeted nation, that begins to look “more like protectionism than legitimate public policy answers.”
At the same time, Dr. Elms stressed that not every case is straightforward. Some examples, she argued, are “glaringly obvious,” while others exist in a gray area. She pointed to trade disputes with Japan in the 1980s as an example of clear-cut protectionism. One Japanese policy claimed that American skis could not be imported because “Japanese snow was different” and therefore US skis supposedly posed a safety threat. The United States dismissed the argument as absurd, insisting that “snow is snow” and that the measure was simply intended to shield domestic producers from competition. More difficult cases, she explained, involve areas like health and safety regulations, especially disputes over pesticide levels or food standards. In those situations, governments may genuinely disagree over scientific evidence and acceptable risk thresholds. One country may view restrictions as legitimate consumer protection, while another sees them as disguised trade barriers. Because of that ambiguity, Dr. Elms said journalists sometimes need to acknowledge when “the jury is out” rather than force a definitive conclusion. But she also argued that reporters should not be overly neutral in cases where protectionism is unmistakable. In situations where policies are clearly designed to discriminate against foreign goods or keep imports out of the market, she said journalists should feel comfortable explicitly calling them “protectionist” rather than hiding behind false balance.
Another attendee asked whether American voters who are facing estimates that tariffs could cost households roughly $1,000 more per year might eventually push back against the Trump administration’s trade agenda through the midterms or other political channels. Dr. Elms responded that Trump’s tariff policies are already “historically unpopular,” citing repeated public opinion polling showing broad dissatisfaction with US economic policy and particularly with tariffs. What she found especially striking, however, was not just opposition to tariffs but the growing popularity of trade itself. Traditionally, she noted, trade “never polled well” and was often blamed for economic hardships. But after the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Americans began to recognize how dependent their daily lives are on global trade flows. She argued that the pandemic reshaped public perceptions because people saw firsthand that international trade made it possible to access vaccines, personal protective equipment, food, and even basic household goods like toilet paper. “Trade actually matters to me,” she said many people realized, and that growing awareness has made Americans “more pro-trade now than they’ve ever been.”
According to Dr. Elms, the public now understands tariffs far more clearly than in the past — to the point where “taxi drivers are talking to you about tariffs.” She said the polling suggests voters generally oppose tariffs and believe current trade policy “needs to be adjusted,” even among some Trump supporters. Nonetheless, she cautioned that tariffs alone are unlikely to determine election outcomes. Voters tend to make decisions based on a broader mix of economic and political concerns, though trade policy will certainly contribute to the overall mood. She also questioned whether Americans will ultimately have “the fortitude to hang in there till the bitter end” with Trump’s argument that tariffs will eventually deliver economic benefits.
Lee added that gas prices are likely to become an even bigger issue in the midterms, particularly because of tensions tied to the Iran conflict. Dr. Elms agreed that energy costs are related more directly to geopolitical instability than tariffs themselves, but she argued that the broader lesson remains the same: trade disruptions affect ordinary consumers in countless ways they may not fully appreciate. She pointed to disruptions involving fuel, jet fuel, plastics, chemicals, and fertilizer as examples of how deeply interconnected the global economy has become. Lee then warned that even if Democrats regain congressional control, there remains a strong protectionist streak in Congress because trade creates diffuse benefits for consumers while concentrated industries often lobby aggressively for protection. As an example, she cited a recent bipartisan letter from more than 100 lawmakers urging a new Section 301 investigation into sugar imports, despite the fact that sugar is already among the most heavily protected industries in the United States.
Dr. Elms said the sugar debate perfectly illustrates why Congress has historically delegated trade authority to the executive branch. Lawmakers recognized that if all 535 members directly controlled trade policy, they would naturally respond to pressure from vocal domestic industries and push the country toward excessive protectionism. Congress therefore created executive trade agencies to handle negotiations and broader economic strategy. Calling sugar “the most classic example of all time,” Dr. Elms argued that US sugar protections have produced deeply counterproductive outcomes. She claimed Americans pay “six times the world price” for sugar as a result of trade barriers, which encouraged the widespread use of alternatives like corn syrup. In her view, those policies contributed to public health problems while simultaneously distorting the market — leading her to conclude that “hypocrisy knows no bounds” when protected industries continue demanding even more trade restrictions.
In her closing remarks, Dr. Elms predicted that tariffs and trade disruptions would continue accelerating in the months ahead, with more countries searching urgently for alternatives to dependence on the United States. She said the merger of trade policy and national security concerns would generate an enormous number of stories for journalists to cover, making this both “a terrible time to be a citizen” and “a great time to be a journalist.”
