How the US-China Race Shifted from Tariffs to Chokepoints
The Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States (AFPC-USA) hosted a Foreign Press Podcast episode in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation titled “How the US-China Race Shifted from Tariffs to Chokepoints.”
In a recent research paper for the National Bureau of Asian Research, with support from the Hinrich Foundation, titled “A New Era of U.S.-China Interaction: From Competing to Racing,” Evan Medeiros, the Director of Asian Studies and the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, argues the 2025 US-China trade war represented far more than a routine tariff dispute, instead marking a significant structural turning point in the relationship. The conflict evolved from a series of retaliatory tariffs into a broader supply-chain war that exposed each country's vulnerabilities and intensified competition over critical sectors such as rare earth minerals, semiconductors, and advanced technology. Medeiros characterizes this new phase as a "race for leverage" between Washington and Beijing.
Medeiros spoke about his findings with journalist Roseanne Gerin, an assistant editor at the newsletter Trade Strategies Today, who has worked in journalism for more than 25 years.
This podcast episode was produced in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this episode. The podcast transcript can be found HERE.
Medeiros explained that his paper began as an open-ended inquiry rather than an effort to prove a predetermined thesis. Responding to Gerin's question about why he viewed the 2025 trade war as a turning point, he said it was already widely accepted that the United States and China were engaged in a long-term strategic competition. What caught his attention, however, was that both countries appeared to be using critical economic "chokepoint" leverage against one another in an attempt to force concessions. That led him to ask whether the 2025 dispute was merely a "garden-variety trade war" or whether "something else" was occurring beneath the surface.
As he reconstructed the chronology of the conflict, Medeiros said he became convinced that the trade war was "more than just a series of tit-for-tat trade actions." Instead, he concluded that it reflected a deeper struggle in which Washington and Beijing were "setting the terms and negotiating the boundaries" of an emerging strategic rivalry. He emphasized that he arrived at this conclusion only after conducting the research, noting that it was through his investigation that he realized "something more profound had occurred."
Evan Medeiros
Addressing Gerin's question about the post-Cold War period, Medeiros described the era as one of "mutual shaping," in which both countries simultaneously engaged and competed with one another. During the 1990s and 2000s, he argued, China was largely operating from a "defensive crouch." Beijing's primary focus was on resisting what it viewed as American efforts to contain its rise, restrict its strategic space, constrain its economy, or undermine its political system. As a result, both sides pursued what he called "two-handed policies" that combined cooperation and competition. According to Medeiros, that dynamic began to change in the years following the global financial crisis. China's economy expanded rapidly, its international influence grew, and the rise of Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012 accelerated a more assertive approach. He said China became increasingly comfortable "throwing its weight around," using both economic power and military capabilities to advance its interests. In his view, the shift from mutual shaping to a more openly competitive relationship was driven by two developments: a China that had become far more capable and a Chinese leader who was willing to deploy those capabilities in "competitive, coercive, and predatory ways" to achieve national objectives.
When Gerin asked about the structural forces behind the growing competition in economics and technology, Medeiros argued that one of the most significant changes was the transformation of the bilateral economic relationship itself. What had been a largely complementary relationship in the 1990s and 2000s became increasingly competitive as Chinese firms moved up the value chain and began producing higher-value goods that directly competed with American manufacturers. He pointed, in particular, to developments beginning in the mid-2000s, after China had largely fulfilled its obligations under the World Trade Organization. At that point, he said, Beijing embraced a more aggressive industrial policy, strengthened state-owned enterprises, and adopted a deliberate strategy aimed at ensuring that China would "dominate certain industries globally." This, he argued, created "a very, very unlevel playing field" not only for American businesses but for foreign companies around the world.
Medeiros also highlighted China's use of market access as leverage. Rather than allowing investment to occur solely through market mechanisms, he said Beijing increasingly required foreign firms to meet specific conditions if they wanted to operate in China. In many cases, companies were expected to transfer advanced technologies that would help China continue moving up the value chain. He described this as the Chinese government leveraging access to its market in ways that Western countries typically would not. He pointed to the significance of the 2015 "Made in China 2025" initiative, which he characterized as the culmination of these trends. The plan, he said, explicitly identified strategic industries that China intended to dominate and committed government resources and subsidies to achieving that goal, further intensifying concerns about economic and technological competition with the United States.
Medeiros argued that understanding the 2025 trade war requires recognizing how different the Trump administration's approach was from that of previous administrations. He said the administration entered the conflict with a "complicated agenda" that combined several objectives. Trump himself was primarily focused on shrinking the US-China trade deficit, while other officials sought structural changes in the Chinese economy, such as reducing subsidies and industrial policies. Still others viewed tariffs as a tool for reshoring manufacturing and changing the behavior of American companies. As a result, the trade war began with what Medeiros described as a set of "mixed motives" and an open question about whether tariffs were even the right instrument to achieve those goals.
He noted that the administration's strategy was particularly unusual because it attempted not only to change Chinese behavior but also to pressure American firms to bring manufacturing back to the United States. Medeiros questioned whether tariffs alone could accomplish that objective, observing that many companies leaving China had simply relocated production to other low-cost countries such as Vietnam and Mexico. Turning to the evolution of the trade war itself, Medeiros said one of the most significant new patterns was China's willingness to escalate rather than retreat. He pointed out that the Trump administration's trade measures were not limited to China but amounted to "effectively a trade war with the rest of the world" following Liberation Day. While many countries sought to avoid provoking Trump and resisted being drawn into escalation, China responded in kind. According to Medeiros, Beijing's refusal to back down produced a "very rapid tit-for-tat escalation" during the spring of 2025.
The conflict intensified dramatically, with both sides imposing tariffs of roughly 150% by mid-April. At that point, Medeiros said, China introduced a new and far more consequential tool: the "weaponization of rare-earth controls." Beijing initially restricted exports of rare earths and specialized magnets to US defense companies before broadening the controls. Medeiros characterized this as a classic "chokepoint control" because China occupied a near-monopolistic position in the mining, refining, processing, and manufacturing of critical rare-earth products. The United States responded with its own forms of chokepoint leverage, marking what Medeiros viewed as the defining innovation of the conflict. For the first time, both countries were openly exploiting "single-point vulnerabilities" in each other's economies. Rather than simply exchanging tariffs, they were using strategic dependencies to impose significant economic costs. In his view, this transformed what began as a tariff dispute into something much larger — a supply chain conflict in which both nations sought to weaponize critical dependencies to force concessions.
Medeiros said this pattern continued throughout much of 2025 until Trump and Xi Jinping eventually met in late October and declared a ceasefire that later evolved into a truce. Discussing China's rare earth strategy, Medeiros emphasized that both countries employed chokepoint controls, though China's actions had particularly visible effects on American supply chains. Rare earth magnets, he explained, were essential components for products such as electric vehicle engines. He cited the example of a Ford plant that reportedly shut down temporarily because it could not obtain necessary inputs. At the same time, he stressed that the United States possessed significant leverage of its own. China remained dependent on American software used to design and manufacture advanced semiconductors, as well as US-produced jet engines for commercial aircraft. Nonetheless, Medeiros argued that Beijing emerged from the trade war believing it had discovered an especially powerful source of leverage. China realized it could place US manufacturing "at risk" in ways Washington could not easily counter because there were no readily available alternative sources for many rare-earth products. Unlike conventional commodities, the United States could not simply purchase them elsewhere at a higher price.
As a result, Chinese leaders concluded they possessed a tool that could be "very, very significant," particularly against a Trump administration that frequently relied on threats and tariffs as instruments of pressure. Medeiros suggested that Beijing believed it had found an effective answer to that strategy. A major portion of Medeiros' remarks focused on what he called a "race" between the United States and China. He introduced the concept because he believed the common description of the relationship as merely a "strategic competition" failed to capture its specific dynamics. His research convinced him that the defining feature of the current phase of competition is a race by each side to reduce its vulnerabilities while preserving or expanding its leverage over the other. He explained that China possesses leverage through its dominance of rare earths while the United States remains vulnerable in that area. Conversely, the United States enjoys leverage through its position in advanced semiconductor technology, while China remains dependent on critical American technologies. The central question, Medeiros argued, is "who can reduce their vulnerability first and who can expand their leverage accordingly."
According to Medeiros, Chinese leaders appear confident that they can eliminate their dependence on American semiconductor technology before the United States significantly reduces its reliance on Chinese rare earths. He expressed skepticism about that assumption but acknowledged that both countries are racing against time. While some US officials have suggested that American vulnerability to rare earths could be substantially reduced within 18 months, Medeiros viewed that estimate as overly optimistic and suggested the reality likely lies somewhere in between. He argued that the competition extends beyond rare earths. China has developed dominant positions in a number of industries because of its concentration of manufacturing capacity. Medeiros pointed to pharmaceuticals as another area of concern, noting American dependence on Chinese production of both basic inputs, such as ingredients for common medicines, and advanced drug development. Chinese laboratories, he said, increasingly occupy leading positions in fields such as gene therapy. Should Beijing choose to "weaponize" those dependencies, the consequences could be severe for the United States.
This broader pattern led Medeiros to describe an asymmetric relationship. China possesses multiple sectors where it can impose substantial costs on the United States if it chooses, whereas American leverage tends to be narrower and more concentrated in specific technologies or products, such as jet engines and advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools. He cautioned, however, that his "leverage-vulnerability matrix" was intended as a snapshot of the present moment rather than a prediction of America's long-term position. The trade war, he argued, demonstrates that a country's position within global networks — whether in technology, finance, manufacturing, or critical minerals — has become a major determinant of power. He referred to this as "positional power." Traditionally, analysts measured power through factors such as population, geography, military spending, and economic size. Medeiros argued that globalization has fundamentally altered that framework. Countries are now trying to determine how to compete with rivals to whom they remain deeply interconnected economically and technologically. As a result, governments increasingly seek to identify and exploit dependencies within those networks. For Medeiros, the most important lesson of the 2025 trade war was not merely that the United States and China entered a new phase of competition. It was that modern great-power rivalry increasingly revolves around discovering, protecting, and weaponizing interdependence itself, making positional power an increasingly important component of the global balance of power.
Medeiros argued that the era of "weaponized interdependence" is not a temporary phenomenon but a lasting structural feature of international relations. Responding to Gerin's question about what the United States and China stand to lose if they cannot move beyond this dynamic, he said countries are still experimenting with how to exploit economic dependencies in ways that achieve strategic goals without imposing excessive costs on themselves. He described the 2025 trade war as the first major test case in which both sides experimented with chokepoint controls and learned how to weaponize vulnerabilities embedded in global supply chains.
Looking ahead, Medeiros warned that if Washington and Beijing fail to find a way to balance economic interdependence with strategic rivalry, the result will be "a lot of economic disruption, a lot of inefficiencies, [and] a lot [of] higher costs." He explained that forcing companies to build supply chains completely separate from China for products such as consumer electronics and pharmaceuticals would make global markets far less efficient. The likely consequences, he said, would include persistent disruptions, occasional shortages during periods of heightened competition, and increased costs for businesses and consumers alike. When Gerin asked how supply-chain competition could spill into diplomacy, security, and global governance, Medeiros stressed that these arenas cannot be separated. Although he said he wanted to be "very modest" in his predictions, he argued that economic competition is deeply interconnected with military, diplomatic, and security issues. Unlike the Cold War, which allowed for some compartmentalization, he believes the US-China relationship makes it much harder to isolate one area of competition from another.
A key concern, Medeiros said, is that both countries are still trying to determine the other's long-term intentions. If the race to gain leverage and reduce vulnerabilities becomes more intense, it could harden perceptions on both sides and make cooperation increasingly difficult. He described the broader challenge as determining "the terms of coexistence" — how the United States and China can "compete and coexist simultaneously." Rather than expecting a grand diplomatic settlement akin to "Potsdam or Yalta," Medeiros suggested that the rules of coexistence will emerge implicitly through interactions between the two powers. However, he cautioned that this process of "boundary exploration" could be "very dangerous and disruptive" because countries often learn the limits of competition through risky encounters.
Turning to China's preparedness for this new era, Medeiros argued that Beijing enters the competition with significant advantages because its leadership has made resilience and self-sufficiency central economic priorities. He said China is actively "re-engineering" its economic model to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and markets, while the United States is not undertaking a comparable effort. As a result, he worries that China will become progressively less vulnerable to economic pressure over time while American vulnerabilities may increase. He cited agriculture as a prime example. According to Medeiros, China has spent years reducing its reliance on American food imports as part of a broader strategy to protect itself from potential disruptions to food, energy, and technology supplies. He noted that Chinese purchases of US agricultural products have declined significantly and argued that Beijing now possesses the flexibility to "turn on and off" purchases of commodities such as soybeans, wheat, sorghum, and corn in ways that can create leverage or impose costs on the United States. In contrast, he said, the American economy lacks a comparable ability to use economic relationships so strategically.
Medeiros summarized this transformation with a striking contrast. During the reform era, he said, China's economy was "built for speed" — designed to maximize rapid growth and development. Under Xi Jinping, however, it is increasingly being "built for combat." By that, he meant that China's economic system is being redesigned on the assumption that long-term strategic and ideological competition with the West is inevitable, leading Beijing to focus relentlessly on reducing vulnerabilities and increasing leverage.
Asked what aspects of the US-China relationship are often misunderstood in media coverage, Medeiros acknowledged the difficulty journalists face in explaining such a complicated relationship in limited space. Nonetheless, he identified several areas where he believes more nuance is needed.
First, he argued that reporting often portrays China as an unstoppable "800-pound gorilla" with enormous momentum while overlooking significant domestic weaknesses. He emphasized that two Chinese economies are emerging simultaneously: a highly advanced, technology-driven manufacturing sector and a struggling domestic economy marked by weak consumption, deflation, rising unemployment, shrinking corporate earnings, and mounting demographic challenges. He noted that China's aging population is already shrinking the workforce and creating substantial fiscal pressures. Second, Medeiros urged reporters to adopt a more balanced view of China's military. While acknowledging that it is large, modern, and growing rapidly, he pointed out that China's military has not fought a war since 1979, whereas the United States has accumulated decades of operational experience through continuous military engagements over the last quarter century. In his view, coverage often highlights Chinese strengths without adequately examining its limitations.
He also argued that media discussions of Taiwan frequently oversimplify China's calculations. While many reports focus on the possibility of an invasion, Medeiros stressed that war over Taiwan could be disastrous for Beijing. Even a successful invasion would leave China responsible for occupying an island of 24 million people, potentially creating what he called the largest counterinsurgency campaign in history. The economic consequences would be enormous as well, potentially undermining China's broader ambitions for national rejuvenation and economic development. As a result, he cautioned against portrayals suggesting China is simply "champing at the bit" to invade Taiwan.
On the American side, Medeiros highlighted what he sees as unresolved contradictions in Trump administration policy. He argued that the administration still needs to articulate a coherent China strategy and questioned the logic of pursuing a détente with Beijing at a time when the underlying sources of competition continue to intensify. He observed that Trump appears somewhat "out of step" with many members of his own party and with broader American attitudes toward China. Medeiros said it remains unclear what the administration hopes to accomplish through this détente or where it ultimately leads. He also encouraged journalists to give Taiwan greater agency in their reporting. Too often, he said, the issue is framed as a contest between China and the United States, when Taiwan's leaders and people also play a crucial role in shaping outcomes.
Medeiros stressed the importance of nuance. He argued that journalists should strive to present "a more fulsome picture" of the complexity of the relationship by highlighting both strengths and weaknesses on each side rather than relying on simplified narratives. He further addressed how foreign correspondents should explain complicated trade and supply-chain issues to general audiences. While acknowledging that supply chains are inherently complex and involve multiple technologies, countries, and regulatory systems, he advised reporters to simplify their storytelling. Rather than trying to explain every detail, journalists should focus on identifying and communicating the "core essence" of the issue at hand. The key, he said, is to understand the fundamental dynamic driving a particular dispute and make that dynamic clear to readers. On US-China competition specifically, Medeiros argued that there is usually a central strategic logic underlying the complexity. Reporters should resist the temptation to "complexify" their coverage and instead concentrate on helping audiences understand the core forces shaping the relationship.
