Russia, China, and Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Ambitions
The Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States recently hosted a podcast in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation titled, “Russia, China, and Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Ambitions.”
Dr. Ian Storey is the principal fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. He specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia. His latest Hinrich Foundation research project examines how Russia and China are using nuclear power projects in Southeast Asia to expand their geopolitical influence. By providing financing, technology, and long-term fuel supplies, Moscow and Beijing can establish lasting strategic relationships with countries seeking greater energy security. The paper argues that these nuclear partnerships could influence Southeast Asia’s geopolitical alignment for decades.
Dr. Storey discussed his research with journalist Jennifer Freedman, who for more than two decades has contributed reporting on trade and global markets for different outlets.
This podcast episode was produced in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this episode. The podcast transcript is available HERE.
Dr. Storey identifies four main factors driving Southeast Asian governments to reconsider nuclear energy: decarbonization, rapidly rising electricity demand, energy security, and advances in nuclear technology.
Dr. Storey says Southeast Asian countries’ commitments to reach net-zero emissions between roughly 2050 and 2060 are creating pressure to gradually move away from coal, oil, and natural gas. While governments are expanding renewable energy such as wind, hydro, and solar, he argues that nuclear power is increasingly being considered as another source of clean energy that can help meet those targets. He emphasizes that climate change is not an abstract concern for the region. Southeast Asian countries are already experiencing its effects, including “rising sea levels, coastal flooding, more intense typhoons and storms, heat stress, and poor air quality.” As a result, decarbonization has become a practical policy concern rather than simply an international commitment.
The second driver is the region’s rapidly increasing need for electricity. Dr. Storey attributes this to industrialization and urbanization, particularly the growth of data centers and semiconductor manufacturing, both of which require substantial and reliable electricity supplies. He also notes that Southeast Asia has “some of the most expensive electricity rates in the world,” creating an additional incentive for governments to explore alternative sources of dependable power.
Dr. Ian Storey
Dr. Storey says recent global disruptions have made energy security an increasingly important consideration. He points to the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the ongoing conflict involving the US and Iran as events that have exposed vulnerabilities in global energy supply chains. The situation in the Middle East is particularly important because “almost all countries in this region are dependent to some extent on oil and gas supplies from the Middle East.” Disruptions to those supplies have therefore encouraged Southeast Asian governments to reduce their reliance on imported energy and strengthen what Dr. Storey calls their “energy security” or “energy sovereignty.”
The fourth factor is what Dr. Storey describes as a recent “renaissance” in nuclear power, driven in large part by technological developments. He highlights small modular reactors (SMRs), which he says are generally cheaper to construct, easier to incorporate into existing electricity grids, and “reputably safer” than traditional nuclear power plants. According to Dr. Storey, these technological developments could make nuclear power more viable for Southeast Asian countries that previously might have viewed conventional nuclear plants as too expensive, complicated, or risky.
Dr. Storey said nuclear power is not necessarily being used as a form of geopolitical signaling. Instead, he argues that Southeast Asian governments are committed to preserving their strategic autonomy and generally avoid aligning themselves exclusively with one major power or bloc. With the exception of countries such as Myanmar, which Dr. Storey describes as an international pariah, most governments in the region have considerable freedom to work with multiple partners. That explains why Southeast Asian countries are engaging with such a wide range of potential nuclear suppliers, including the United States, European countries, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Rather than choosing nuclear technology as a way of formally aligning with one side, governments can use competing offers from different powers to advance their own energy and strategic interests.
He is skeptical of some of the ambitious timelines announced by governments. In regard to Myanmar, he says Russia has agreed to provide an SMR for Naypyidaw, but there is little publicly available information about its cost or construction schedule. He questions whether Myanmar can meet an aggressive timeline given its ongoing civil war. In Vietnam, Russia has agreed to build two conventional nuclear plants in southeastern Vietnam. Vietnamese President Tô Lâm wants them operational by 2030–2031, but Dr. Storey calls that “really quite unrealistic.” Conventional nuclear plants generally take at least a decade to build, meaning the more realistic target is the mid-2030s, assuming everything goes according to plan. Indonesia is considering nuclear power, particularly SMRs, and is looking at the mid-2030s. Dr. Storey considers that much more realistic. Most other Southeast Asian countries are looking toward the mid-2030s to early 2040s, which Dr. Storey considers sensible because governments first need to establish regulatory systems, train personnel, secure financing, negotiate agreements, and then construct the plants.
Dr. Storey says Russia's biggest advantage is its nuclear industry's experience. He noted that Moscow has built nuclear plants in roughly 40 countries and offers an unusual build-own-operate (BOO) model. Rather than simply selling a reactor, Russia can provide a package covering the entire lifecycle: design, construction, fuel, operation, and — particularly importantly — waste management. That arrangement can last 60 to 80 years, creating an exceptionally long-term relationship between Russia and the recipient country. Russia also offers substantial financing, potentially covering 80%–85% of construction costs through loans. He points out that Russia’s economic footprint is small, diplomatic influence is limited, it is not a major regional security provider, and Russian arms sales have declined dramatically since the invasion of Ukraine. Nuclear power, therefore, represents one of Moscow's few important technological niches in the region. He says Russia is already “way far ahead” of its competitors in Southeast Asia in terms of contracted nuclear projects, with Myanmar and Vietnam having signed agreements and discussions also taking place with countries such as Indonesia and Laos. For Moscow, nuclear deals can strengthen bilateral relationships with Southeast Asian governments, deepen ties with countries with which Russia already has relatively close relations, showcase Russian technology to other countries in the Global South, and reinforce Russia's image as a technologically advanced major power.
Dr. Storey believes China is rapidly emerging as Russia’s main competitor in the global nuclear market, but Beijing has so far struggled to translate its impressive domestic nuclear capabilities into overseas sales. Over the past three decades, China has built a highly advanced nuclear industry and has set an ambitious goal of becoming the world’s leading supplier of nuclear technology by the middle of the century. Like Russia, China is offering a build-own-operate model, combining reactor technology with financing and long-term operational support. Beijing is promoting two main technologies: the Hualong One, a conventional pressurized-water reactor, and the Linglong One, an SMR. However, Dr. Storey notes a significant gap between China’s domestic success and its international track record. Pakistan is currently China’s only overseas nuclear customer, having purchased three Hualong One reactors, while China has yet to sell an SMR abroad. Because Southeast Asian governments appear particularly interested in SMRs rather than large conventional plants, Dr. Storey expects China to increasingly emphasize Linglong One in its regional marketing.
Dr. Storey identifies three major reasons why Southeast Asian countries have been reluctant to embrace Chinese nuclear technology. He pointed out that Russia is perceived by some countries as a more proven nuclear partner. Despite Russia's geopolitical problems, it has decades of experience building and operating nuclear power plants overseas. Some Southeast Asian governments, therefore, view Moscow as a more established and reliable nuclear supplier than Beijing. China's territorial disputes create concerns about strategic dependence. China is involved in contentious South China Sea disputes with several Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. Dr. Storey argues that these countries would be especially wary of allowing China to operate something as strategically important as a nuclear power plant. The concern isn't necessarily that China would physically attack or sabotage a reactor. Rather, Dr. Storey raises the possibility of economic leverage during a political crisis: China could potentially use control over the operation of a nuclear facility to restrict electricity supplies. He compares this concern with Russia's use of oil and gas pipelines as leverage in Europe and Central Asia. Governments are also wary of accumulating long-term Chinese debt. Some Southeast Asian countries are concerned that Chinese financing could create financial dependencies that eventually give Beijing leverage over strategically important assets. Dr. Storey points to China's involvement in infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including debt-related concerns involving Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Laos.
He further stressed that nuclear power is fundamentally different from a short-term infrastructure project because of its extraordinarily long lifespan. A nuclear power plant can operate for 60, 80, or even 100 years, meaning the relationship between the supplier and recipient country can extend across generations. That creates dependencies involving not only financing but potentially technology, fuel, maintenance, expertise, operations, and waste management. The central challenge for China, therefore, isn't simply convincing Southeast Asian governments that its reactors work. It must convince them that accepting Chinese nuclear technology won't leave them strategically dependent on Beijing for decades. Dr. Storey observed that “China has its work cut out” in overcoming these suspicions.
Southeast Asia’s nuclear preparedness is a “work in progress,” says Dr. Storey, noting that governments that are considering nuclear power are investing heavily in the foundations needed to operate reactors safely, including training technicians, developing legislation and establishing independent regulatory agencies. He says these countries are also working to meet international requirements, including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some countries have decades of experience with experimental reactors, while others have virtually no nuclear experience and therefore face a “very steep learning curve.” Indonesia appears to be the regional leader in regulatory preparedness, according to Dr. Storey, while Vietnam is making progress and “catching up.” But there is one major regional weakness: nuclear waste management. No Southeast Asian country currently has the capacity to manage nuclear waste independently. This makes the Russian and Chinese offers particularly attractive because both countries include waste management in their nuclear cooperation packages. Dr. Storey notes that the US and other Western suppliers historically have not offered the same level of waste-management support, suggesting this could put them at a competitive disadvantage.
Dr. Storey is unequivocal that nuclear power is extremely expensive, particularly compared with renewable alternatives. A single SMR could cost close to US$2 billion, while conventional nuclear plants can cost US$10 billion–US$15 billion. The final price can climb even higher because of construction delays, cost overruns, regulatory difficulties, and the expense of training and operating a nuclear workforce. He contrasts those costs with wind, solar, and hydropower, which are generally cheaper to develop. But there is an important trade-off: renewables are weather-dependent, whereas nuclear provides a steady and predictable supply of electricity. That reliability is a major part of the economic argument for nuclear power in Southeast Asia. Governments may be willing to accept enormous upfront costs in exchange for a dependable source of electricity and the possibility of lower electricity prices over the long term. He also argued that a purely financial calculation misses the important factors that are energy security and energy sovereignty. The disruption to oil and gas supplies following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz illustrates the vulnerability of countries dependent on imported fossil fuels. Southeast Asian governments are now scrambling for alternative supplies and paying premiums to secure them. With this context in mind, he suggested that nuclear power’s appeal isn't simply about producing electricity as cheaply as possible. It's also about reducing exposure to volatile international energy markets and ensuring that countries have a reliable domestic source of power for decades.
Dr. Storey cautioned against overstating the geopolitical consequences of Southeast Asian countries choosing Russian or Chinese nuclear technology. He emphasized that governments across the region place a high value on strategic autonomy — their ability to make decisions independently without being pressured by larger powers. Rather than aligning themselves with a particular bloc, Southeast Asian countries generally try to maintain relationships with all of the major powers, including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. As Dr. Storey put it, they “work very hard to preserve their strategic autonomy and their agency.” For smaller countries in particular, he said, it makes sense to avoid becoming dependent on any single external power. That approach is likely to shape how governments pursue nuclear development. Rather than relying exclusively on Russia or China, countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia are likely to diversify their suppliers, potentially purchasing multiple plants from different countries. Dr. Storey described this as a familiar regional strategy: governments will “shop around” and negotiate with multiple suppliers, effectively playing competing powers against one another to secure better terms. While diversification is the dominant strategy, Dr. Storey noted that individual countries have different preferences based partly on their histories and existing relationships. Vietnam’s decision to work with Russia, for example, reflects a longstanding relationship dating back to the Cold War. By contrast, countries with close ties to the United States, such as the Philippines and Singapore, are less likely to turn to Russia. Instead, they may look toward the United States, South Korea, and Japan, countries with which they are more comfortable strategically.
Dr. Storey said public acceptance of nuclear power in Southeast Asia is increasing, but only slowly and from a low starting point. The word “nuclear,” he explained, continues to carry powerful negative associations, not only because of nuclear weapons but also because of major nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Fukushima, in particular, had a significant effect on Southeast Asian governments. Dr. Storey said the 2011 disaster “really put off some Southeast Asian countries from pursuing nuclear power until very recently.” There is also a familiar political contradiction in public opinion: people want the benefits of nuclear energy without necessarily wanting a plant in their own communities. As Dr. Storey put it, people increasingly want “cheaper and more reliable supply of electricity,” but “they don't want to live next door to a nuclear power plant.” He stressed that this tension is not unique to Southeast Asia and can be found around the world. As governments move forward, they are therefore beginning to invest in public education campaigns designed to reassure citizens about nuclear safety. But Dr. Storey suggested that building public confidence will be a long-term process. Governments may support nuclear power, but winning public acceptance will require sustained efforts to demonstrate that the technology is safe.
On whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could establish common nuclear safety standards or regional emergency-response mechanisms, Dr. Storey pointed to the existence of ASEANTOM, the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, which promotes cooperation among regional nuclear regulators. The network works on issues including emergency preparedness, radiation monitoring, nuclear security, and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But Dr. Storey argued that ASEAN's institutional structure makes deeper integration unlikely. Southeast Asian governments are highly protective of their sovereignty, particularly because many countries in the region have only been independent for six or seven decades. ASEAN's longstanding principle of non-interference in members' internal affairs is another obstacle. Nuclear power is considered a national matter, and ASEAN lacks the degree of institutional integration found in the European Union. The countries are also moving toward nuclear power at very different speeds. For those reasons, Dr. Storey expects nuclear development to remain primarily a national endeavor, with regional cooperation taking place through a growing network of bilateral agreements. He pointed to recent nuclear cooperation agreements involving countries such as Indonesia and Singapore as a possible indication of a broader trend. The result, he suggested, will be a patchwork of cooperation: national governments will retain regulatory authority while working with the IAEA, ASEANTOM, and foreign nuclear suppliers through bilateral agreements.
As Freedman closed out the conversation, Dr. Storey warned that the United States is losing ground to Russia and China in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and that Washington needs to move more quickly if it wants to preserve its influence in the region. His recommendation was specific: the United States needs to become a more credible supplier of nuclear technology, particularly SMRs. Dr. Storey noted that Washington has already signed nuclear cooperation agreements with several Southeast Asian countries, but argued that this is not enough. Southeast Asian governments are increasingly interested in SMRs, yet US companies have not actually deployed the technology commercially at the scale Russia and China have.
