Podcast Transcript — Russia, China, and Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Ambitions
The Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States recently hosted a podcast in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation titled, “Russia, China, and Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Ambitions.”
Dr. Ian Storey is the principal fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. He specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia. His latest Hinrich Foundation research project examines how Russia and China are using nuclear power projects in Southeast Asia to expand their geopolitical influence. By providing financing, technology, and long-term fuel supplies, Moscow and Beijing can establish lasting strategic relationships with countries seeking greater energy security. The paper argues that these nuclear partnerships could influence Southeast Asia’s geopolitical alignment for decades.
Dr. Storey discussed his research with journalist Jennifer Freedman, who for more than two decades has contributed reporting on trade and global markets for different outlets.
This podcast episode was produced in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this episode. The learning takeaways are available HERE.
Jennifer Freedman: This is an episode of the Foreign Press USA Podcast, produced by the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the USA, in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation, an independent Asia-based philanthropic organization dedicated to advancing mutually beneficial and sustainable global trade. AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of today's episode. I'm Jennifer Freedman, and I've spent more than two decades reporting on trade and global markets for outlets including Bloomberg, MLex, and Borderlex.
Today, I'm joined by Ian Storey, principal fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, to discuss his new Hinrich Foundation white paper, “Going Nuclear: Statecraft, Security, and Safety in the Race for Asia's Nuclear Energy Future.” It's the second installment in a three-part series examining the governance, technology, and geopolitics shaping Asia's nuclear energy race. In this paper, Ian explores how Russia and China are pushing aggressively into Southeast Asia's nuclear power sector. He argues that these projects aren't just about electricity, but about influence.
Long-term financing, fuel supply, and technology transfer give Moscow and Beijing strategic footholds in countries seeking energy security. His message is clear. Southeast Asia's nuclear choices will shape its geopolitical alignment for decades. Ian, thank you so much for being here.
Ian Storey: Thank you, Jennifer. Thanks for having me on the podcast.
Jennifer Freedman: Let's start with the fundamentals. What is actually driving Southeast Asian governments to revisit nuclear power now? Is this primarily about energy security, decarbonization commitments, or something more political?
Dr. Ian Storey
Ian Storey: It’s a combination of factors. I think there are four main factors that we can focus on. The first is, as you've said, decarbonization. Most Southeast Asian countries have committed to a net-zero carbon emission goal between 2050 to around 2060, and that will require the gradual phasing out of fossil fuels. That's coal, oil, and natural gas, and a greater use of renewable energy resources such as wind, hydro, and solar, as well as clean energy resources, especially nuclear power. Now, it's worth noting that Southeast Asia has been severely impacted by climate change, including rising sea levels, coastal flooding, more intense typhoons and storms, heat stress, and poor air quality. So, climate change is very real for countries in the region.
The second reason is rising demand for electricity caused by industrialization, especially the rise of data centers and semiconductor production plants, as well as urbanization. Southeast Asia, in fact, has some of the most expensive electricity rates in the world.
The third factor is energy security or sometimes energy sovereignty. Recent supply chain disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and most recently, and still ongoing, the US attacks on Iran, which have effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz — they've had a big impact on countries in Southeast Asia, particularly the latter, because almost all countries in this region are dependent to some extent on oil and gas supplies from the Middle East. These events have pushed regional states to try and bolster their energy security by reducing their dependence on overseas energy imports.
A fourth factor is that nuclear power has experienced something of a renaissance recently, partly due, or mainly due to the emergence of new technology, principally small modular reactors or SMRs, which are cheaper to build, easier to integrate into existing power grids, and reputably safer than conventional nuclear power plants.
Now, you mentioned geopolitical signaling. Well, that's not really a factor per se in that Southeast Asian countries avoid aligning with a particular power or bloc in order to preserve their strategic autonomy. And Southeast Asian countries, with a few exceptions — Myanmar, or Burma, as some of your listeners may know it, which is something of an international pariah. So most Southeast Asian countries can partner with whomever they want, and they can have multiple partners as well. And that's why regional states are talking with a variety of potential suppliers, including the US, Europe, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia as well.
Jennifer Freedman: Now, several governments, including maybe those that you just mentioned, have announced ambitious timelines for nuclear development. Based on your research, which of these timelines are realistic and which are more aspirational or politically motivated?
Ian Storey: Two countries in Southeast Asia have already signed on with Russia to build nuclear power plants, and that's Myanmar and Vietnam. Russia has agreed to supply Myanmar with a small modular reactor to be based in the capital Naypyidaw. The details are scarce, including how much it's going to cost and when it's going to be built, when it's going to be finished. But Russia is building the same model of SMR in Uzbekistan in Central Asia, which is meant to become operational in five or six years. Now, whether Myanmar can achieve that or not, given that the country is racked by a civil war, remains to be seen.
Russia has also agreed to build two conventional nuclear power plants in Southeast Vietnam. And the Vietnamese leadership, particularly President Tô Lâm, he's very gung-ho on nuclear power. He wants these two power stations operational by 2030, 2031. But really that's only what, five or six years away from now, but that's really quite unrealistic as it takes at least a decade to build a conventional nuclear power plant. So realistically, even if everything goes to plan, and that's a big if, we're looking at the mid-2030s before those two plants become operational.
Indonesia, which is Southeast Asia's largest and most [populous] country, is also keen to acquire NPPs, nuclear power plants. It's also talking to Russia as well as other countries, especially about SMRs, and its timeframe is around the mid-2030s. I think that's much more realistic. So, we're looking at 10, 10-plus years from now. And most other Southeast Asian countries are looking at about the same timeframe from the mid-2030s to the early 2040s. And that's sensible as it takes years to put in place the regulatory frameworks, to train the technicians, to run the plants, to raise financing, to negotiate, and then, of course, to build the actual plants themselves.
Jennifer Freedman: Now, as you mentioned, Russia, and specifically Rosatom, is extremely active globally, including in Southeast Asia. What is Russia's strategic objective in the region, and how does nuclear cooperation fit into Moscow's broader geopolitical playbook?
Ian Storey: Russia has one of the world's most advanced nuclear power industries. It has a long and, I think, quite a successful track record of building nuclear power plants overseas in roughly 40 countries, which is quite an impressive record.
Unlike other countries, it offers a build, own, and operate model, B-O-O, that provides full life service from design to construction, to fueling, to operation, and, crucially, waste management. Now, not many other countries offer, in fact, I don't think any other countries — and we’ll come to China later — offer waste management when it comes to nuclear power. And it offers this over a 60 to 80-year period. It also offers pretty generous financial packaging with loans covering 80 to 85% of construction costs. Generally speaking, Russia in Southeast Asia, it's very much a secondary player, certainly compared with the US and China, but even other countries like Japan and some European countries.
Russia's economic footprint is tiny in Southeast Asia. Its diplomatic influence is limited. It's not really a security provider either. It doesn't conduct many military exercises in the region. Its arms sales have basically dropped off a cliff since the invasion of Ukraine, but it does offer some niche technologies, and nuclear power is one of them. And as I just mentioned, two Southeast Asian countries have contracted with Russia to build atomic power stations. So, Russia's way far ahead of its competitors in Southeast Asia. It's talking to other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Laos.
Is there a strategic angle to this? Well, there's always a bit of a geopolitical angle to these kinds of deals. It's certainly a way for Russia to strengthen bilateral ties with certain Southeast Asian countries, particularly ones it already has good, fairly close relations with, and to showcase its technologies to other countries in the Global South as well as I think you can say as well, it's a way of burnishing its major power credentials because this tends to be what big countries, technologically advanced countries do.
Jennifer Freedman: Now, you mentioned China, which is pushing to export its Hualong One reactor. How aggressively is Beijing pursuing nuclear partnerships in Southeast Asia and what kind of long-term dependencies might accompany Chinese financing and technology?
Ian Storey: China is snapping at the heels of Russia over the past three decades. It's developed a very advanced nuclear industry very quickly and has set a goal in the typical Chinese way of becoming the world's leading supplier of nuclear technologies by the middle of this century. It's taken a leaf out of Russia's playbook by offering a similar build, own, operate model, including financing and is marketing, like Russia, two kinds of reactor, a conventional pressurized water reactor called the Hualong One, as you mentioned, and an SMR, small modular reactor called Linglong One. But despite China's successful track record at home in building nuclear power plants, overseas, it's been much less successful. In fact, it only has one overseas customer to date, and that's Pakistan, which is a close ally of China. And Pakistan has bought three Hualong One reactors. But China has yet to sell any of its SMRs overseas.
In general, Southeast Asian countries are much keener on adopting SMR technology than large conventional power plants. So I think China going forward will probably focus its marketing efforts on the Linglong One rather than the Hualong One.
So why is it that Southeast Asian countries, indeed countries around the world, but okay, we'll focus on Southeast Asia, have been reluctant to buy from China? And I think there are three main reasons.
The first is that Russia is seen by some regional states as a much more reliable partner than China due to its long track record as a supplier of nuclear power plants to overseas customers.
Secondly, in Southeast Asia, China is embroiled in a contentious maritime dispute with five Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea over a small group of islands, most seriously with the Philippines and Vietnam. So both of these countries would be extremely wary of allowing China to operate a strategic asset such as a nuclear power plant. The concern would be that China could weaponize a nuclear power plant during a crisis by shutting down the reactor and thus depriving the country of electricity. Now, this is what we've seen Russia do with its pipelines, with its oil and gas pipelines in Europe and in Central Asia as well.
I think the third reason is there's a reluctance in Southeast Asia, in some Southeast Asian countries at least, to acquire long-term Chinese debt. Given that in the past, Beijing has used foreign debt to gain ownership of strategic assets such as ports in countries participating in its Belt and Road Initiative. I'm thinking specifically of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but Laos is heavily in debt to China because China funded a high-speed rail in the country. As you point out, acquiring nuclear power plants, it's a long-term commitment. The life of a nuclear power plant [is] typically 60, 80, maybe even a hundred years.
And that, of course, creates long-term dependencies, which not all countries [want]. China has its work cut out to try and overcome these suspicions in the region.
Jennifer Freedman: As we all know, nuclear power requires strong regulatory institutions and a robust safety culture. Which Southeast Asian countries are genuinely prepared for that, and where do you see the biggest gaps?
Ian Storey: It's a work in progress. All Southeast Asian countries that have expressed a desire or intention to acquire nuclear power are currently training a large number of technicians, some of them overseas, to operate nuclear power plants. They're drawing up comprehensive legal and legislative frameworks and independent regulatory agencies to enforce training, safety, and security standards, and to meet international obligations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency protocols, as well as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some states are more advanced along the path than others. Some Southeast Asian countries have decades of experience working with at least experimental reactors, while some of them have next to no experience in these kinds of matters. And so, for them, it's a very steep learning curve. So some countries are ahead of others. Indonesia actually has probably the region's most advanced regulatory nuclear power framework. Vietnam is catching up.
When it comes to waste management, no Southeast Asian country has the capacity to deal with this issue, and that is what makes Russian and Chinese models attractive to them as both countries offer to process waste management. Now, that's something that the United States and other countries at present, at least, and historically do not offer. And they may have to change that in the future if they are to make inroads into this region and others as well.
Jennifer Freedman: Interesting. When you compare nuclear power with alternatives like LNG [liquefied natural gas], solar, geothermal, and regional grid integration, does nuclear actually make economic sense for Southeast Asia?
Ian Storey: Nuclear power is eye-wateringly expensive. For a small modular reactor, you're probably not going to have much change left from US$2 billion, maybe a bit less. Conventional nuclear power plants, they range in price from US$10 billion to US$15 billion, although Russia, China, [and] South Korea might be able to offer them at a cheaper rate. These power plants are often very expensive as well due to cost overruns, construction delays, regulatory problems, and that kind of thing. So often they take, as I mentioned, they take over a decade to complete, and that raises the costs. Then of course, there's the training and operational cost as well that you have to add to all of this.
So nuclear power is much more expensive than renewable energy resources such as wind, solar, and hydro. But those renewable energy resources are dependent on the weather, and therefore they're not as reliable as nuclear power. And that's really what you want when you're talking about a constant and regular source and reliable source of electricity. Countries appear willing to absorb the high upfront costs in return for long-term gains that should, at least in theory, bring electricity prices down over time. And of course, we mustn't forget that you really can't put a price on energy security, energy sovereignty. As some countries in Southeast Asia are now finding out because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, they're desperately scrambling around for alternative sources of oil and gas, and they're paying a premium to get those resources as well.
Jennifer Freedman: Right. Now you mentioned the US, which we haven't discussed much except peripherally. If Southeast Asian countries proceed with Russian or Chinese nuclear projects, how might that reshape regional geopolitics and strategic alignment over the next decade?
Ian Storey: I think we should be careful not to exaggerate that issue. As I mentioned earlier, Southeast Asian countries work very hard to preserve their strategic autonomy and their agency. That is their ability to make decisions by themselves without being pressured from other countries. They do that by deliberately not aligning with particular blocs or particular countries. They don't choose sides, or they try not to choose sides, and they try to keep on good terms with all the major powers. They want to trade with all the major powers. They want to keep on the good side of all major powers. And of course, that makes perfect sense if you're a smaller country in this part of the world. So, for that reason, they will try to avoid becoming dependent on one country. And to avoid that, they will shop around and they'll talk to different suppliers, especially the bigger countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, which are looking at acquiring multiple plants.
So, they'll be talking to multiple countries. They won't just be relying on either Russia or China or the US. They'll be looking at different countries. They'll be playing these countries off against each other to try and get a better deal from another supplier. That's pretty typical here. But of course, some countries, they do have their preferences, particularly due to historical reasons. I mean, this explains why Vietnam and Russia have agreed to build nuclear power plants. Vietnam has a longstanding relationship, longstanding friendship with Russia going back to the Cold War. It's why I think countries like close US partners like the Philippines and Singapore won't be partnering with Russia.
They'll be looking at the US maybe, but they'll also be looking at South Korea and Japan as well because they feel more comfortable with these countries. So, in short, I think that the acquisition of nuclear power plants by Southeast Asian countries over the next few decades, it's unlikely to reshape regional geopolitics. I think it will be more in line with current practices of diversification and not becoming dependent on one country or one bloc. But it is tied up, of course, in this intensifying geopolitical competition that we see in Southeast Asia, including, of course, in technology such as semiconductors, phones, telecommunications, and that kind of thing. And it's becoming more and more difficult for Southeast Asian countries to navigate these rivalries and this competition. But so far, they're quite successful. They're quite canny at doing this.
Jennifer Freedman: Okay. And how significant is public resistance to nuclear power in Southeast Asia? Do governments underestimate the political risks of pursuing nuclear projects?
Ian Storey: Opinion polls have shown that public acceptance of nuclear power in Southeast Asia is rising, but it's rising very slowly and from a low base. So now it's quite clear why this is so. For many people, the word “nuclear” has extremely negative connotations. It's not only associated with nuclear weapons, but also with nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl in 1986. And more recently, of course, Fukushima in Japan in 2011. In fact, that particular incident really put off some Southeast Asian countries from pursuing nuclear power until very recently. That accident had a big impact on the region. Now, people want cheaper and more reliable supply of electricity, but they don't want to live next door to a nuclear power plant. So, they want nuclear power, they want a reliable source of electricity, but they don't want to live next to one. This is not just in Southeast Asian countries; this is in countries across the world.
Governments have had to mount or are starting to mount in some countries educational campaigns in an effort to reassure their citizens that nuclear power is safe. Now, that will be an ongoing process that will take a while until people really are comfortable with nuclear power.
Jennifer Freedman: I wonder if I can briefly ask a question about ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. Do you think ASEAN is capable of developing shared nuclear safety standards or regional emergency response mechanisms, or do you expect that nuclear development will remain entirely national?
Ian Storey: I think the short answer is no to the first part of the question. I mean, ASEAN has something called the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy or ASEANTOM. That was set up to build cooperation among nuclear regulatory bodies across Southeast Asia to enhance nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. It meets annually and engages closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its mandate covers things like emergency preparedness and response, environmental radiation monitoring, nuclear security, and the combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. But Southeast Asia is a region where countries jealously guard their sovereignty. Remember, most countries have only been independent for 60 or 70 years. Also, one of the core principles of ASEAN is non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and generating nuclear power is an internal affair and internal matter. So for these reasons, ASEAN… and also ASEAN lacks institutional integration. ASEAN is not by any means like the European Union, far from it in fact.
These factors and the fact that Southeast Asian countries are moving at different speeds to adopt nuclear power, that means I think that nuclear development will remain a national endeavor, but that does not mean that Southeast Asian countries will not be signing bilateral agreements as they've been doing now for quite some time [with] external powers such as the US, Russia, and Japan, et cetera, on nuclear cooperation. And I guess we're just starting to see a trend of Southeast Asian countries signing bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation as Indonesia and Singapore recently did. I think that could be the start of a trend. So we are seeing cooperation between ASEANTOM and the IAEA, but the regulatory authority will remain the prerogative of national governments. But that will be complemented by this web of bilateral agreements between Southeast Asian countries or among Southeast Asian countries and the nuclear power providers.
Jennifer Freedman: Ian, thank you for the clarity and depth of your insights. This is obviously a very complex topic with long-term implications for energy security, regional politics, and strategic dependence, and your work helps illuminate the choices Southeast Asian governments are facing. Before we wrap up, is there any brief final thought that you'd like to leave our listeners with?
Ian Storey: I think as many of your listeners are in the United States, I would say that the United States is losing ground to both Russia and China in Southeast Asia and around the world for a whole host of reasons. And so if the United States wants to maintain its credentials, its influence in the region, it really needs to start looking at providing nuclear technology to Southeast Asian countries. It's already signed a number of agreements, the 123 Agreements with certain Southeast Asian countries, but it really needs to move much faster on this, particularly the provision of small modular reactors, which is what Southeast Asian countries are looking for and which the US has yet to build. It keeps talking about building them, companies in the US, but they haven't actually done it yet, whereas both Russia and China have done so. So, the US needs to catch up.
Jennifer Freedman: Thank you again, and thank you as well to everybody who joined us here today. Ian Storey's full paper is available on the Hinrich Foundation website, and we encourage you to read it for a deeper dive into the issues we discussed. Once again, this educational program is produced in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation, and the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the USA is solely responsible for the content of this podcast episode.
