Navigating the New Age of Geopolitical Asset Seizures
The Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States (AFPC-USA), in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation, recently invited international correspondents to a timely educational program examining how asset control and “seizure-like” state actions are becoming normalized tools of economic statecraft — and what this shift means for coverage of trade, investment, sanctions, and geopolitics. Drawing on the Hinrich Foundation white paper “The new age of geopolitical asset seizures,” the discussion explored how governments across jurisdictions are increasingly moving from regulation toward control when strategic assets are involved — often through emergency laws, courts, licensing, sanctions, and financial enforcement mechanisms.
Correspondents heard from Shannon Brandao, a Portugal-based legal and geopolitical analyst and internationally regarded China expert. Her work examines the intersection of trade policy, national security, and strategic asset governance, with a focus on how governments are reshaping global investment rules in an era of great-power competition. Trained in international commercial law, Brandao has worked across public, private, and nonprofit sectors on cross-border regulatory and geopolitical risk issues. She advises global clients on geopolitical market dynamics, including export controls, sanctions regimes, and supply-chain resilience. She is the founder of the China Boss newsfeed on LinkedIn and the China Boss newsletter on Substack, where she provides analysis on China-related business and geopolitical developments.
The event was moderated by Jennifer Freedman, a France-based journalist and editorial consultant. She has worked at newspapers and international media organizations in the United States, the Middle East, and Europe. She was with Bloomberg News for almost 15 years, first in Brussels and then as trade correspondent in Geneva. She worked as a senior correspondent (covering trade) and editor at MLex, and as managing editor and trade writer at Borderlex. She now works as an editorial consultant for international institutions and think tanks, editing and occasionally writing reports on trade, gender, climate and environment, and commodities.
AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this educational program. Below, foreign journalists can read the takeaways from the discussion.
Brandao argued that a “new age of geopolitical asset seizures” is taking shape, with governments increasingly intervening in assets without formal confiscation. While “ownership remains firmly with the private owner,” states are removing control in ways that produce, “for the most part, the same” effect as nationalization. She stressed that this is a “structural” and cross-regional shift — not a one-off — driven by geopolitical tensions, supply chain “repoliticization,” and a growing willingness to cross traditional market boundaries. At the center is a redefined notion of national security, where “national resilience” — focused on economic and industrial strength — now takes precedence over efficiency.
Brandao highlighted how governments are deploying a range of “seizure-adjacent tools,” from emergency laws to investment screening, often altering investor rights after the fact. In some cases, factors such as “strategic proximity” to sensitive infrastructure determine intervention. She warned the result is a fragmented global system with “less predictability,” narrower protections, and rising risks of “tit-for-tat” retaliation between states. While the trend is “very dynamic” and evolving quickly, she argued that the priority should be to manage it through transparency, coordination, and more harmonized rules.
Brandao drew a clear distinction between traditional expropriation and the more subtle forms of control she analyzed in her paper. Outright confiscation — what she described as “expropriation” or political “nationalization” — remains rare in Western democracies because it carries “much higher legal thresholds,” intense scrutiny, and significant backlash from both the public and the business community. While such actions may become more common in wartime contexts, she said there has not been a meaningful uptick in outright seizures, aside from ongoing debates such as those involving Russian assets in Europe. However, Brandao emphasized that governments are increasingly turning to indirect methods. Even if they avoid formal confiscation, they are “not … hesitant” to use available tools to “seize control in some shape or form” — whether by restricting access to funds, altering management, or limiting operational control. In that sense, she argued there already is an uptick, driven by concerns over “national resilience” in a volatile geopolitical environment.
Shannon Brandao
When Freedman asked why China appears so frequently in cases involving seizures and state intervention, Brandao explained that China’s central role stems from how deeply it has become embedded in the global economy over the past three decades. Countries now face “over-reliance” and “overdependence” on China across critical sectors — from minerals and pharmaceuticals to batteries — making it difficult to decouple. At the same time, rising US-China rivalry, particularly under Chinese President Xi Jinping, has triggered what she described as a kind of “reckoning,” even a “panic,” among Western and allied economies to “claw back” industrial capacity. The fear is that China could “turn off the tap” and disrupt key supply chains, prompting governments — still in a peacetime context — to intervene and regain control over sensitive industries without resorting to outright nationalization.
In a follow-up, Freedman pointed out that China itself has taken similar actions against Western firms, particularly those involved in information gathering. Brandao said this is not simply “tit for tat,” but reflects China’s broader view of information as a core element of national security. Under Xi, she argued, security concerns extend far beyond what Western countries typically consider sensitive. She noted that China’s system — where the state and the Communist Party maintain deep ties to industry — creates incentives to control information flows and protect domestic interests. Authorities may restrict foreign firms not only for political reasons but also to prevent outsiders from gaining “real and true information” about the health of Chinese companies or the broader economy.
Brandao cited examples of US consulting and due diligence firms facing raids, penalties, or shutdowns. Companies engaged in research, expert networks, or corporate investigations — business models tied to the “information economy” — are especially vulnerable in China, where such transparency is viewed with suspicion. Overall, she argued that China’s prominence in these cases reflects both its economic centrality and its expansive definition of national security, which increasingly justifies intervention — particularly in areas involving data, expertise, and financial insight.
Brandao also acknowledged that while investors can still “invest with confidence,” they can no longer afford to ignore geopolitical risk. As she put it, companies cannot assume “this is just external geopolitics” — because it “absolutely can affect you,” often in ways that do not become clear “until it’s too late.” She stressed that firms now need to actively assess their exposure: what “diversification” really means in their sector, how regulations — especially in places like China — affect them, and whether their operations touch “sensitive” industries or supply chains. Even traditionally open Western systems are tightening, and the definition of what counts as sensitive is expanding and constantly shifting.
While legal protections still exist, Brandao warned that “emergency override risk is increasing” and political discretion is widening, making outcomes less predictable. The core issue is that ownership itself is evolving — governments may not formally nationalize assets, but they can still take control, leaving companies with diminished authority despite retaining legal ownership. She pointed to real-world cases where firms temporarily lost access to funds or control mechanisms, underscoring how disruptive these interventions can be even when later moderated.
Looking ahead, Brandao said the first challenge is simply recognizing the scale of the problem. From there, she emphasized the need for greater international coordination, potentially through forums including the Group of Seven or the Group of 20, to harmonize approaches and stabilize the investment climate. She also outlined key principles for managing these risks: governments should ensure actions are proportional to threats, maintain transparency with clear processes and legal remedies, and work to avoid escalation or retaliatory “tit-for-tat” cycles. Ultimately, she argued that acknowledging the trend and fostering open dialogue are essential first steps toward making this new era of state intervention more predictable and governable.
In a response to a question from a journalist who wondered if journalists are “perhaps still covering these cases too narrowly as isolated disputes,” Brandao agreed that journalists may be missing the bigger picture. While coverage often focuses on individual disputes within specific countries, she said the reality is more systemic — a “very macro” shift that is unfolding too quickly for many to fully “connect the dots.” She noted that while large law firms and consultancies are already tracking these risks internally, their analyses often remain private. As a result, she sees a need for more public-facing reporting to show how these cases fit into a broader transformation affecting global supply chains and domestic economies.
Responding to whether this signals the end of truly private strategic assets, Brandao’s answer was blunt: “yes.” In a geopolitically volatile world, she said, the assumption that sensitive assets can remain fully private is breaking down. Governments are increasingly willing to “cross those market boundaries” and intervene whenever they perceive insecurity. She emphasized that the biggest challenge is that what counts as “sensitive” is no longer obvious or fixed. It is not just traditional sectors like defense or advanced technology — industries such as smartphones can become strategic if they are tied to economic development or national resilience goals. Overall, Brandao’s point was that state intervention is expanding across a widening range of industries, meaning the line between public control and private ownership is becoming increasingly blurred.
Brandao pushed back on the idea that legal ownership has already become secondary to political permission — saying “it depends” on the country, industry, and political context. In most capitalist systems, she stressed, ownership rights remain “very firm” and still primary. However, those rights are no longer absolute. Governments can and do adjust them based on what they define as necessary for “national resilience,” a concept that varies by country and increasingly overlaps with economic security rather than traditional defense concerns. She drew a sharp distinction with China, describing it as a fundamentally different system. There, ownership as understood in capitalism “doesn’t mean anything” in the same way — having your “name on a piece of paper” offers little protection if the state decides to intervene. In her view, China operates through a lens of centralized control, where the government prioritizes authority over markets, especially in sectors it considers sensitive.
Responding to the idea that true power lies in controlling the conditions under which assets operate, Brandao said that characterization is “accurate,” particularly in the Chinese case. Rather than needing to formally seize ownership, the state can simply assert control when it chooses. She added that while China has long operated this way, other countries are beginning to move in a similar direction — though more cautiously and within legal frameworks. Democracies, she noted, are trying to replicate some degree of that control through new laws and regulatory tools, while still adhering to constitutional norms. She stressed that ownership still matters globally, but control is becoming more important, and the balance between the two is shifting as governments seek greater authority over strategic assets.
Brandao said legal fragmentation will definitely change how firms operate — and, in fact, it already has. Companies “have to” adapt to protect themselves, shifting away from traditional market-based risk assessments toward ones centered on “national security or national resilience.” She explained that this requires a fundamental mindset change: businesses must now think in terms of political risk, not just economic efficiency. Questions such as what “diversification” or “nearshoring” means are no longer abstract — they must be applied specifically to each firm’s supply chains, partners, and exposure to volatile regions. For example, a company tied to India’s smartphone industry may need to reconsider whether sourcing components from China is still viable. She emphasized that this creates a heavy burden, as firms are not used to evaluating geopolitical risks tied to things like “semiconductor packaging in Europe” or shifting regulatory environments. What was once a straightforward business decision — outsourcing to the most efficient location — now requires constant monitoring of political developments across multiple jurisdictions.
She illustrated this shift with the example of forced labor regulations tied to China’s Xinjiang region. Although the issue existed for years, it became a “politicized supply chain” after COVID, leading governments to impose restrictions that forced companies — especially in textiles and retail — to rapidly restructure sourcing. The result was widespread disruption, higher costs, and lasting changes in supply chain strategies. She thinks global firms must now integrate geopolitical awareness into core business strategy, as legal fragmentation and state intervention make the international operating environment more complex, costly, and unpredictable.
Brandao said a follow-up to her paper would likely expand in two main directions: documenting more real-world cases and, more importantly, exploring how to “harmonize” the growing patchwork of rules. Drawing on her background in international business law, she said she would focus on creating more streamlined frameworks so firms could invest across countries including the US and Germany “without so much headache and disruption,” ensuring more consistent protections and screening processes. On whether policymakers are paying attention, Brandao suggested the issue is still emerging. While high-profile cases — like Nexperia in Europe — may prompt governments to “take another look,” she believes most countries are still in reactive mode, dealing with fast-moving geopolitical shocks rather than stepping back to assess the broader impact. As she put it, “everything is happening too fast,” and no one has fully reckoned with the “mess” being created for cross-border business.
Brandao argued that meaningful change will likely be driven by investors and the business community, which are already pushing for “greater predictability” and confidence. If uncertainty continues, declining investment flows could force governments and multilateral institutions to respond. Geographically, Brandao expects that pressure to begin largely in the West — particularly among transatlantic business networks that are accustomed to relatively frictionless cross-border operations. However, she noted that disruptions are increasing even there, citing the Nexperia case, where a Dutch semiconductor firm with Chinese ties became the subject of political pressure from Washington, illustrating how geopolitical tensions can quickly escalate and override normal business considerations. Ultimately, she warned that the risk of disruption is “so much higher” today, with geopolitical tensions — from great power competition to conflicts including the Iran war — continuing to ripple through supply chains. While she stopped short of being “doom and gloom,” her outlook suggested that without stronger leadership and coordination, instability will keep intensifying, further complicating global investment and trade.
She closed on a sober note, agreeing that global volatility shows no signs of easing — “I don’t see it yet” — and suggesting that ongoing instability will continue to shape government behavior. She encouraged listeners to actively watch emerging cases to understand the trend in real time, pointing to the Port of Darwin situation in Australia as a key example. While the government has not yet canceled the Chinese-linked lease, there is growing pressure and even threats of “countermeasures,” illustrating how geopolitical tensions can quickly escalate around strategic assets. She also highlighted developments in countries such as Japan and Germany, calling them “remarkable.” She noted that rising defense spending — particularly in Germany — signals that governments are taking national security more seriously and, in turn, broadening what counts as national security. As countries expand their definitions of “economic resilience,” they are more likely to intervene in markets — meaning the trend toward greater state control over strategic assets is likely to continue.
