Why the Russia-China Axis Isn’t Going Anywhere

Western policymakers sometimes comfort themselves with the idea that the Russia-China partnership is fragile. Perhaps China will lose patience with Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. Perhaps Russia will resist becoming China’s junior partner. 

According to Professor Aaron Danis of the Institute of World Politics (IWP), however, these hopes aren’t realistic. In an extended conversation, Danis told me that the strategic alignment between Moscow and Beijing may not only be enduring, but it is apparently deepening. 

“They don’t love each other,” he said, “but they agree on this: they want to change the West’s rules-based order.” He goes on to say that they’re not truly against a rules-based order, but they want the order to be based on their rules, not ours.

Their shared rejection of the West in general and the United States in particular has resulted in a partnership that is evolving from cautious coordination to growing military and economic collaboration. Just a decade ago, their militaries held just a  few joint exercises. In 2024, that number was 14. “The tempo and scope of these drills show us they’re preparing together—for contingencies that involve us,” Danis warned.

Beijing’s ambitions are on full display in the South China Sea, where it has transformed dozens of rocky outcrops into fortified islands, complete with runways, radars, and missile systems. “They start with a rock and a dredger, and they end up with what they refer to as ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier,’” Danis said. “These new artificial islands are a way to project power far beyond their shores and to establish control over the South China Sea.” These actions are a threat to the US allies in the area.

China’s expansionist vision extends beyond the Pacific. It now claims to be a “near-Arctic power” and is eyeing rare earth resources and shipping routes in the thawing North. Though Russia has long regarded the Arctic as its domain, the two countries seem to be carefully managing any friction this is causing. “There’s overlap and even rivalry in the  Central Asia and the Arctic,” Danis said, “but their larger strategic goal, opposing the West, takes precedence.”

This marks a change from the past. In the 1960s, a Sino-Soviet split escalated into open conflict along the Ussuri River. However, in 2003 the two countries settled their territorial disputes and just days before Russia invaded Ukraine, they declared a “no-limits partnership.” 

China may have its “no limits partnership,” but it also has some major vulnerabilities. Its population is aging, its economy is sputtering, and inequality between its cities and countryside is stark. Danis talked about his son’s recent visit to China: “He said once he went beyond the gleaming skyscrapers of the first-tier cities,  he saw vast rural poverty.”

In Danis’s experience, authoritarian regimes frequently outlast what we’d tend to predict, especially when they monopolize the levers of control and repression. Russia follows a familiar authoritarian playbook.  Critics of the Kremlin often wind up poisoned, imprisoned, or worse – and escaping overseas is no guarantee of protection. Both regimes believe that dissent equals danger—and that liquidation is a form of policy. When it comes to eliminating resistance, they both are apparently fine with Stalin’s explanation of why he killed dissenters: “"Death solves all problems. No man, no problem.”

Xi Jinping may have a firm grip on power, but when he leaves, will this change Beijing’s course? Danis doubts it. “Even if Xi were replaced, the institutional momentum behind reunifying with Taiwan and challenging U.S. power isn’t going anywhere, but it may slow.”

Danis emphasized the asymmetric nature of the Russia-China partnership. “Russia needs China far more than China needs Russia,” he said. “The flow of weapons and resources has reversed. And while China hasn’t rubber-stamped everything Russia does—particularly in Ukraine—the alliance holds because the larger strategic goal remains intact.”

Local grievances exist, –such as Chinese citizens wanting to get Vladivostok back, (it was once belonged to China  but is now held by Russia,) or Russians grumbling about Chinese expansion in the Arctic or the South China Sea. Still, Danis says that they haven’t risen to the level that would cause a shift in policy.  “It’s like Americans complaining about Canadians and vice versa,” Danis said. “There’s friction and griping, but we’re not shooting at each other.”  

The West might do well to shed the comforting illusion that the China-Russian alliance is a marriage of convenience destined to end quickly in divorce. The relationship is firmly rooted in mutual policy interests, and sustained by their authoritarian tools of repression. “We hope they’ll break up, and indeed they may,” Danis said, “but hope is not a strategy, and a solid strategy is what the United States needs to counter this threat.”