Where the Ukraine War is Concerned, Moscow and Beijing Are Unquestionably Interlinked
As geopolitical tensions between China and the United States continue to rise, it’s important to understand all of the factors that have contributed to our current moment, particularly as the Ukraine war and Beijing’s relationship with Russia continue to stoke concerns across the Western world.
Emily de la Bruyère, co-founder of Horizon Advisory, a consultancy firm that specializes in the study of China's global economic influence, and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), has shed light on how the West's response to Putin's war on Ukraine has allowed China to benefit from its “access to the Russian market and resources” while cementing Moscow's dependence on Beijing.
Emily de la Bruyère
She spoke with the Association of Foreign Correspondents (AFPC-USA) to provide them with a greater understanding of the issue, emphasizing that China's support for Russia has implications for multinational businesses, governments, and China's strategic rivalry with the United States, particularly as it relates to “industrial competition” and access to critical resources. With China providing Russia with capital, goods, and even military-relevant technologies, the West risks “inflicting costs” on itself without succeeding in punishing Russia appropriately.
The international system has been unwilling to confront Beijing for its support to Russia, she says, partly due to “global industrial and economic dependence” on China. Thus, the continuation of the Ukraine war serves Beijing's interests, as it makes Moscow “economically and geopolitically beholden” to Beijing while keeping the West “embroiled in a protracted conflict that risks draining energy resources, defense industrial base capabilities, economic vitality, and political resolve to compete abroad.”
De la Bruyère’s interview with foreignpress.org is within the scope of AFPC-USA’s partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. The AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this interview.
The following conversation has been condensed and edited for clarity.
How has China benefited from Putin’s war on Ukraine and the West’s response?
Putin’s war on Ukraine and the West’s response have allowed Beijing to benefit from ready access to the Russian market and Russian resources, and cemented Moscow’s dependence on China -- while the West, which China sees as a strategic competitor, faces the consequences of limited access to Russian resources.
This advantage for China likely holds regardless of the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war. If Russia wins, China does well – including in its effort to degrade the West’s role in the international system. And a loss for Moscow does not mean a loss for Beijing. If Russia loses, China secures Moscow’s role as a vassal. All likely without being forced into the losers’ camp: Beijing has thus far managed to play both diplomatic and commercial sides of the war.
In what ways does the war make Moscow economically beholden to China?
The West has responded to Moscow's invasion of Ukraine by attempting to isolate Russia from the international system – precisely at a time when the war effort strains Russia’s resources. This puts Moscow in a position of dependence on the one, major economic, commercial, and technological champion that continues to support it: China. With trade with much of the rest of the international system cut off, Russia relies on China for income, advanced technologies, and military-relevant goods. And this in turn grants Beijing leverage over Russia, its resources and economy, and its geopolitical decision-making.
How does the continuation of the Ukraine war serve Beijing’s interests?
The continuation of the Ukraine war serves Beijing’s interests along two main dimensions.
First, the war makes Moscow economically and geopolitically beholden to Beijing. And that grants China access to and leverage over Russia’s industrial capacity, resource wealth, and geopolitical positioning.
Second, the war keeps the West embroiled in a protracted conflict that risks draining energy resources, defense industrial base capabilities, economic vitality, and political resolve to compete abroad. While China benefits from low-cost access to Russian resources, the West finds itself in an environment of resource scarcity – and therefore at an industrial disadvantage.
And thus far, Beijing has thus far faced minimal repercussions for its support to Russia. China has managed to maintain diplomatic and commercial ties with the very countries leading the effort to punish Moscow.
How has China helped Russia mitigate the consequence of its isolation from the global financial system?
China has continued to trade with Russia, providing it with both capital; goods, including military-relevant goods and technologies it needs; and potentially access to the international market. That last point is worth teasing out: Not only does China continue to serve as a market for Russia, granting it revenue despite the West’s efforts to isolate it, but China also serves as a conduit to other markets as goods sold from Russia to China risk in turn being exported more broadly throughout the international system.
More abstractly, Beijing’s continued support for and economic and commercial ties to Russia legitimize it – and legitimize the act of doing business with it – even as the West seeks to make Moscow a pariah state.
In short, as a result of its channels to Beijing, Moscow is not facing the costs that it was assumed it would. Meanwhile, the West faces all the uncertainties, dislocation, and strain of limited access to Russian resources.
What are the risks associated with the West’s protracted conflict with Russia?
The West’s efforts to impose costs on Russia through financial and economic restrictions also impose costs on the West: Russia is a resource behemoth – a leading producer of oil and gas, but also of critical materials like neon, aluminum, and palladium, as well as industrial products. Those are foundational industrial building blocks, necessary inputs for everything from semiconductors to airplanes. By confronting Russia, the West is effectively cutting off its access to those resources. And the West is doing so at a time of great power industrial competition, notably with China.
And the real risk isn’t just that this is a cost the West has to bear. It’s that the West risks inflicting this cost on itself without succeeding in appropriately punishing Russia – because of China’s support for that country.
How has Beijing’s ability to maintain diplomatic and commercial ties with countries resisting the Russian invasion allow it to avoid consequences for its support to Russia?
Thus far, the international system has been unwilling to confront Beijing for its support to Russia. In part, this is because Beijing has been relatively subtle in its approach, including keeping much of its support, or obvious support, to the commercial rather than explicitly military domain. In part, this is also because of the extent of global industrial and economic dependence on China. Confronting Russia has been proven to come with significant costs. Those pale next to the challenges that would accompany real confrontation of Beijing.
European leaders’ continued engagement with Beijing throughout Russia’s offensive in Ukraine – and the nature of that engagement – offers a useful case. Germany is among the leading countries in the effort to punish Moscow for its aggression. But in November, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz traveled to Beijing, where he met with Xi Jinping. And Scholz did so at the head of a business delegation of German executives intent on maintaining economic and commercial ties to China. During that visit, China’s state-owned Aviation Supplies Holding Co. signed a framework agreement with France-based Airubs to procure 140 Airbus aircraft – a deal that underscores the stakes for Europe as it seeks way to impose consequences on China for its support to Russia.
What are the implications of the Sino-Russia partnership for multinational businesses, governments, and China’s strategic rivalry with the United States?
Tactically, the ties binding Moscow to Beijing pose operational and reputational risks to international players who do business with Chinese entities. Their exposure to China increasingly subjects them to the regulatory and diplomatic risks of exposure to Russia.
More strategically, the advantage Beijing gains from the Russia-Ukraine conflict could enhance its confidence and capacity to flex its international industrial muscle, expanding its global presence and willingness to intervene in proxy battles abroad. That, in turn, is poised to increase tension between the United States and China – placing third-party countries and their companies in the middle of escalating geopolitical conflict. All of this while Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to sow chaos in the international system.
Alan Herrera is the Editorial Supervisor for the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (AFPC-USA), where he oversees the organization’s media platform, foreignpress.org. He previously served as AFPC-USA’s General Secretary from 2019 to 2021 and as its Treasurer until early 2022.
Alan is an editor and reporter who has worked on interviews with such individuals as former White House Communications Director Anthony Scaramucci; Maria Fernanda Espinosa, the former President of the United Nations General Assembly; and Mariangela Zappia, the former Permanent Representative to Italy for the U.N. and current Italian Ambassador to the United States.
Alan has spent his career managing teams as well as commissioning, writing, and editing pieces on subjects like sustainable trade, financial markets, climate change, artificial intelligence, threats to the global information environment, and domestic and international politics. Alan began his career writing film criticism for fun and later worked as the Editor on the content team for Star Trek actor and activist George Takei, where he oversaw the writing team and championed progressive policy initatives, with a particular focus on LGBTQ+ rights advocacy.