Changing the Ban on U.S. Military Contractors in Ukraine: The Most Effective Path to Victory

Ukrainians are shedding blood for their freedom, but no matter how great their courage, sacrifice, and suffering, their fate is overwhelmingly influenced by decisions we make in the United States. One of these decisions is one that retired Brigadier General Mark Arnold believes could give the Ukrainians a vastly better chance of reclaiming their country. It’s a decision that could quickly pay dividends in less bloodshed.

The decision involves correcting a mismatch in the help we provide the Ukrainians. While we’ve been impressively generous with weaponry, Ukrainian commanders tell Arnold that as of now, we haven’t enabled the Ukrainians to make maximum use of these weapons because the West has underinvested in training.

The problem for the Ukrainian armed forces is the legacy of military training left over from the Soviet era. The 10% of Ukrainian officers who have received training in Western military procedures tell Arnold that far too many of Ukraine’s military officers who haven’t trained in the West are stuck in the post-Soviet military era with their procedures and attitudes. As Arnold learned from his Ukrainian colleagues, “Their approaches to such things as command and control, logistics, and planning are killing people.”

Arnold regularly visits the front lines in Ukraine. His conversations are held in bunkers and the Ukrainians who talk with him relay how they can’t compete with Russia in the quantity of men, so they need to have a qualitative advantage. They’ve told him that transforming their military through the Western approach of trust and collaboration between officers and men—and away from the fear-based Soviet-style approach—is the best, surest, and most economical path to victory.

Arnold is impressed by how much Ukrainians see this approach as an answer. “They’ve made this crystal clear to me that they want to reverse the culture of fear that guides their adversary’s approach to command.”

Arnold has an example of how dysfunctional the Russian culture of fear is. “In the Russian army it regularly happens that when poor logistics and tactics result in military failure, commanders don’t want to report the failure to those above them. The mistakes go uncorrected and then repeated.”

Arnold believes that to give the Ukrainians the qualitative advantage that they’re seeking, we will need to allow former military men and women with expertise to be instructors in Ukraine. He knows that this has to be in-country because it has to be done on a scale that quickly influences the entire Ukrainian 800,000-man army.

He believes that an instructional approach while simultaneously training Ukrainian trainers could be accomplished with as few as 300 retired American experts. His Ukrainian colleagues have already mapped out how this can be done, including having the information transfer occur during the times when entire military formations are rotated away from the front lines. These Ukrainian officers tell Arnold that the American instructors and mentors could do their work, and would be out of Ukraine in roughly a year.

Interestingly, there’s no law or regulation that stands in the way of having American contractors work in Ukraine. “It’s strictly a policy issue,” Arnold points out, adding, “and that means reversing it could happen relatively quickly, if the right decision-makers agree.”

Arnold understands the reasons for the existing policy. The first on most people’s minds is the risk of escalation.

His answer to that is, “At every step, we’ve been held back by fear of escalation, and of course we need to pay attention to this. However, the Russians are already putting all they can into this war, and their options for escalation beyond what they’re doing are limited. We can’t ignore the nuclear threat, but we know and the Russians know that if the Russians cross that red line, it will be suicidal. And if America and the West succumb to nuclear blackmail, then the world will become far more dangerous.”

What about the risk of Americans getting killed?

“There are many Americans who, when weighing the risks of death or injury versus the knowledge that they can help save Ukraine’s democracy, are eager to sign up for this.  The talent required are former cadres at our largest maneuver training centers and schools and former brigade commanders and senior echelon staff officers.” Arnold likes the late Dr. Martin Luther King’s quote, “It’s always the right time to do the right thing.” And basic military force protection measures like those honed during 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan could all but eliminate the risks to western trainers.

And what about the chance of this looking as if we’re know-it-alls who are swooping in telling people what to do?

Arnold doesn’t see this as a danger. “First,” he emphasizes, “it’s the Ukrainians who are asking for this help. Second, the former American officers and NCOs who will be doing the work know to check their egos at the door. As military professionals, they will respect the individuals they’re instructing, knowing the Ukrainians are fighting the most high intensity warfare than any military has experienced since the Korean War – but where technology has made Ukrainian battlefields considerably more lethal.” The U.S. trainers will also be looking to learn about the unique nature of the Ukraine battlefield to share knowledge with the U.S. Armed Forces. 

The key to Ukraine's success in its struggle for freedom lies not only in the provision of military equipment but also in adopting Western military concepts. By integrating Western approaches in logistics, command and control, synchronization and communication, planning, and overcoming outdated Soviet-era military practices, Ukraine can gain a qualitative advantage over its adversary, while further preparing itself for NATO membership.

Arnold hopes decision-makers will see the advantages of changing the ban on American contractors in Ukraine. He hopes they’ll see that Ukraine’s best chance of retaining its sovereignty, and preventing future Russian aggression is the qualitative advantage they can get from removing the Soviet-era approach of command through fear and replacing it with the Western approach of collaboration and trust.