Educational Program: One Year of War in Ukraine: The Changing Global Order and Where We Go from Here

Educational Program: One Year of War in Ukraine: The Changing Global Order and Where We Go from Here

The war in Ukraine has challenged the existing global order. February 24, 2022 marked the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of a sovereign nation. One year on, journalists, policymakers, and the general public are still trying to make sense of the war and the humanitarian crisis that has erupted in its wake.

So how do we assess the massive human toll of the conflict and the shift in international relations still reverberating as the war rages on?

To learn more about this topic, The Association of Foreign Press Correspondents (AFPC-USA) came together for an educational program to learn from two experts: the political scientists Daniela F. Melo, of the University of Boston; and Everett A. Viera III, of California State University, Fresno.

This educational program was held on Friday, February 24 and was moderated by journalist Ana Rita Guerra, a U.S. correspondent for ​​Lusa, Dinheiro Vivo, Diário de Notícias.

The AFPC-USA is solely responsible for the content of this educational program. Below, readers will find a summary of some of the most important takeaways from the presentation.

ON THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF THE WAR

  • Melo says there is no expectation that the war will end “anytime soon.” At the moment, “there's a Russian offensive” and “the issue of potential shortage of ammunition in the supply of the Ukrainian front,” which is “a problem that needs to be resolved within NATO and the allies.” Interestingly, as unfortunate as this is, “it’s not hurting as much as some analysts thought it might be,” in part because sanctions have been somewhat circumvented. The Ukrainian population of course remains supportive of the war effort. Additionally, there remains “an alignment between European and American elites and the Ukrainian public, which is “unusual” as far as foreign policy is concerned. Much of the European public also remains supportive of the war effort.

  • Viera notes that Russian President Vladimir Putin underestimated how difficult taking Ukraine would be. He reiterated much of what Melo said and added that the toll of the war—including the impact of war crimes and the effects on those displaced—is definitely much higher than appears on the surface, which is already bad enough. In regard to support for the war in the United States, he accepts that there has been some decline in support, particularly from Congress, which has “pushed back.” However, President Joe Biden recently traveled to Kyiv and affirmed U.S. support for the war effort.

ON HOW THE WAR CHANGED THE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE

  • Melo says there has been “a shift in the balance of power at the international level” as Russia has tried to hold on to superpower status and as the U.S. and China see tensions between them rise. She notes the great power competition between the U.S. and China dates back several decades and the U.S. has erred on the side of “keeping the liberal international order functioning” and that China “has a different understand of what it wants this international order to look like.” She does not necessarily think we are “entering a new Cold War.”

  • Melo believes the war in Ukraine has served as a “litmus test” for the location of “fracture lines” on the global level. There have been realignments in the global order, pointing to how these have affected Africa, where South Africa and Russia have conducted naval exercises. China has continued to purchase Russian oil and support Russia economically if not militarily. It continues to test its neutrality in the ongoing conflict.

  • Viera agrees that China continue to “straddle the line” of the conflict and has “supported… or at least welcomed” Russia in Africa and the Middle East as it continues to face U.S. blowback. He does not necessarily believe the war has reshaped the global order—at least, not yet.

  • Viera says Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is almost like a “lab experiment” for China “to see how the West will respond to a war of aggression.” The variable here is Taiwan: How would the West respond if China invaded Taiwan? He says: “How fast can the West mobilize right in support of a smaller democracy to see how fast and or how slow, depending on your perspective [of how] the United States and their allies have come to the aid of Ukraine might be indicative of how fast the United States and their allies might come to the aid of Taiwan in the future, should China decide to invade?”

  • Melo observes that China “is engaging in triangular diplomacy” by “engaging Russia in a way to gain leverage on the United States in the areas of conflict that it has with the United States” and is “using the rift between the United States and Russia to gain leverage on its own issues.” 

ON HOW THE INFLUX OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES COULD IMPACT EUROPE

  • Viera says that Europeans largely feel an ethnocentric affinity with Ukrainian refugees, which is why they’ve been so welcomed in comparison to refugees from places like Syria or Afghanistan. There is a degree of racism involved, he adds, and conservatives in different countries will always push back. Predicting whether worsening economic conditions could worsen relations with refugees in the future is difficult.

ON WHETHER A PROLONGED WAR WILL BENEFIT RUSSIA

  • Melo says that worsening economic conditions are “always bad for stability” and “often put a lot of pressure on leadership to change track, whatever that track is.” However, she says Europeans largely understand that the war poses an existential threat. There could be a shift in public opinion in the event that Russia “gained a major advantage.” She does not necessarily believe Russia “truly benefits from a protracted conflict “that is… likely to return to the status quo of the borders before.” Russia is “unlikely to win a war in which the other side is deeply committed and has so much heart in the fight.”

  • Viera says the war “means more to Russia and Ukraine than to Western allies” and that “anything short of an absolute destruction and capitulation of the Ukrainians or of Ukraine to Russia would be seen as a loss for  Russia.” He says Putin is “a spin doctor” and he poses the possibility of Putin using Russia’s massive resources (and the fact of its presence in the Donbas region and Crimea to “negotiate a peace settlement” based on those acquisitions. While that would reflect badly on Russia, Putin does not need to take Ukraine entirely to support his belief in Russia remaining a viable state but it is “unlikely” to remain viable “after so much destruction.”

ON WHETHER THE KREMLIN’S INTERNAL POSITION WILL SURVIVE THE WAR

  • Melo says Putin is “projecting” power because of a host of different variables that place him “in danger with his own elites and the population.” The economy is, for instance, but one factor here that has generated dissent but “nobody can predict with any certainty” how Russia will fracture because of all the variables at play.

  • In the event the war ends, she adds that Ukraine would likely receive a significant amount of support from the European Union (EU) in the event it becomes a member state. Because “international investment would flock to a place like Ukraine to help rebuild the country,” giving it “a path to viability.”

ON HOW PEACE TALKS MIGHT UNFOLD

  • Melo says “it takes two to tango” for peace talks to be viable. While it is difficult to tell what Putin might do next, it is evident he “doesn’t feel that he is in a position in which he needs to negotiate” or “come out and stipulate the terms.”

ON WHAT TO EXPECT FOR THE REST OF 2023

  • Melo says Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “has really proven his chops and determination as a political and military leader in this fight for the very existence of Ukraine” and has framed it as “not just a fight for Ukraine but a fight for the liberal order.” Zelenskyy “has been a critical piece in being able to pull together this coalition of support for the country” and she expects him to continue playing that role.

  • She goes on to say that “Putin’s ultimate goals are unclear” and “it’s hard to have a starting point for diplomacy and negotiation if you don't know what the ultimate goal of the enemy is.” An agreement that makes a “safe space for both sides” would have to be an agreement that is “safe” to Putin because “otherwise he won’t enter it.” It is “vital” for the West to defend Ukraine because Putin “will put everything he has into the war in 2023.”

  • Viera points out that the war is one “of democracy against authoritarianism” and “supporting international institutions.” He expects “this will be a long, protracted war.” What victory might look like for Ukraine is still very much unclear. All in all, he believes Zelenskyy has done “an excellent job” of rallying his troops and rallying his people and will continue to do so.